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MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE
IN NEED OF A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
LEONA GREEN*
As we approach the third millennium, we find ourselves with
a more demographically diverse workforce than ever before, with
numerous statutory bases upon which to vindicate workplace
rights. Our challenge as an industrial democracy is to determine
how to devise fair, economical and efficient methods to resolve
the myriad of statutory based workplace disputes. This public
policy issue has become increasingly important in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.1
In Gilmer, the Court, for the first time, held that a statutory
civil rights claim2 can be subjected to mandatory arbitration.'
The Court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 4 demon-
strated a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.5 The Court
further noted that once a "bargain to arbitrate" has been made,
"the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the stat-
utory right at issue."6 The Court's decision in Gilmer has had a
profound impact on the ability of employees to seek judicial
redress for violations of statutory civil rights claims when they are
subject to arbitration agreements that are not initiated through
collective bargaining.7 Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, in an
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. The civil rights claim in Gilmer was brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
3. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
5. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
6. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). To determine if Congress intended to
preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies, such a waiver must be found in the text
of the civil rights statute at issue or its legislative history, or there must be "an
'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the [statute's] underlying purpose."
Id.
7. As Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold noted, "[a]n entire industry-
Wall Street-and a growing number of companies . . . have been able to
circumvent formal legal challenges to their unlawful employment practices in
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early effort to return the tool of judicial redress to individuals
who have had their statutory civil rights violated by employers,
introduced legislation which sought to amend various civil rights
statutes to prohibit the waiver of statutory rights.'
The purpose of this article is to examine the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 the
issues which remain unaddressed in its aftermath, and the
attempts that have been made by lower courts, members of Con-
gress, and various professional organizations and associations,
such as the American Bar Association,1" the American Arbitra-
tion Association,11 the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolu-
tion, 2 jAMS/EnDispute,1" and the Center For Public Resources,
New York Institute for Dispute Resolution to address the out-
standing due process issues.14 Based on a critical analysis of one
of these protocols, developed through the efforts of a number of
organizations in this rapidly developing area, the author suggests
court ...." 141 CONG. REc. S2272 (daily ed. Feb.7, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Feingold). Senator Feingold further noted that "[e]mployers can tell current
and prospective employees, 'if you want to work for us you'll have to check your
rights as an American citizen at the door'." Id.
8. See infra notes 311-15 and accompanying text (discussing the specific
civil rights statutes which would be affected and the nature of the changes to
the statutes).
9. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
10. The American Bar Association (ABA) is an organization of 375,000
attorneys who are members in good standing of the bar of any state in the
United States. The purpose of the ABA is to conduct research and educational
activities in an effort to encourage the professional development and
improvement of its members. It also provides public services. See 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 510 (Christine Maurer & Tara E. Sheets eds.,
33rd ed. 1998).
11. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides administrative
services for disputants interested in arbitration, mediation and negotiation. It
also provides administrative services for the impartial administration of
elections, provides for disputants a panel of arbitrators and mediators, and
conducts training sessions in the area of conflict resolution. See 1 id. at 501.
12. The Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) has 3,200
members, consisting of professional neutrals. They include arbitrators,
mediators, hearing examiners, and fact-finders. The neutrals are involved in
the resolution of disputes in the areas of labor-management, employment,
community, environmental, family and other types of disputes. SPIDR seeks to
further the acceptability and increased public awareness of the processes of
dispute resolution and provides skills training. See 1 id. at 503.
13. JAMS/EnDispute is a private service provider of neutrals in the areas
of commercial disputes, employment disputes, etc. The organization uses
retired judges among its core of arbitrators. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DIsPtUrE RESOLUTION AND LAwYERs 504 (2d ed. 1997).
14. The CPR maintains a national and regional panel of arbitrators who
primarily focus on major disputes. See id.
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changes to the current proposed legislation that are designed to
strike a fair, equitable and practical balance between the evolving
public policy supporting mandated arbitration and the equally
strong public policy of preserving individual statutory workplace
rights.
Despite the fact that the arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination disputes involves the individuals the civil rights
statutes were developed to protect, not much attention has been
paid to the reaction to, nor the effect upon, those participants in
the processes. 15 Throughout this analysis, the author attempts to
address the issue of how these proposals may negatively affect or
impact members of lower socio-economic groups and racial
minorities, women, and the disabled.' 6 Section I will focus on
the Supreme Court's treatment of the arbitrability of civil rights
claims prior to Gilmer. Section II will examine the Gilmer decision
and explain why the Court's decision cannot be reconciled with
its prior holdings. Section III will advance the contention that
civil rights claims are best served by ajudicial rather than an arbi-
tral proceeding. Section IV will discuss the cases decided by the
lower federal courts since the Gilmer decision was rendered. Sec-
tion V will discuss the private and public initiatives advanced in
the aftermath of Gilmer and critically examine one of the propos-
als to test the degree to which it insures due process. Section VI
will discuss the current response to the due process concerns in
the use of mandatory arbitration. Section VII will discuss cur-
rently proposed legislation that will serve to preserve the judicial
forum for employees who have experienced discrimination at the
hand of their employers, while considering the legitimate con-
cerns of employers and make suggestions for what should be
included in any legislation in this area.
15. Eric K Yamamoto has noted the paucity of literature referencing
racial minorities, women and the poor in the discussions of the use of various
ADR mechanisms. See Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR. Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36
SANTA Ci_- A L. REV. 1055 (1996). Yamamoto's survey of the 400 law review
articles concerning ADR between early 1992 and late 1995 indicates there was
'notable treatment' of the assessment of various ADR devices, the cost and time
reduction elements, efficiency, and general user satisfaction aspect of ADR.
But, "[t]he race and gender critiques, by comparison, were either cited in
passing or ignored." Id. at 1063.
For a critique of ADR processes which focuses on the benefits to individual
disputants but diminishes the more expansive goals of the civil rights laws, see
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1987).
16. The basic contention is that Title VII, the premier civil rights statute,
was essentially developed and passed to protect blacks in employment due to
historical discrimination. During the debates, members of Congress
recognized that other classes of employees needed protection as well.
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I. MANDATORY ARBITRATION PRIOR TO Gi.-w-Rj
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
To fully understand the evolution of mandatory arbitration,
it is necessary to first examine the United States Arbitration Act
of 1925.17 The use of arbitration dates back to the earliest days
of world history.1 " In the United States, one of the earliest
acknowledgments of the usefulness of arbitration was codified in
the FAA, which was enacted to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate.' 9 Prior to enactment of
the FAA, American courts had adopted, as a reflection of English
common law, a degree of judicial hostility towards arbitration
agreements. 20 However, Congress recognized that, because of
the congestion in the courts and the resulting delay, expense and
"technicality" of litigation, arbitration offered a cost-effective and
expeditious alternative; thus, the FAA became law.2 ' It is now
beyond question that arbitration offers a faster, less expensive,
and less formal forum for litigants than does the judicial
alternative. 2
2
The pertinent provision of the FAA, for purposes of
mandatory arbitration, states that "[a] written provision . . . to
settle by arbitration a controversy.., or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."23 The FAA,
on its face, excepts from its reach certain contracts of employ-
17. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994)).
18. SeeJulius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 266 (1926). Arbitration was used as early as the
medieval period to settle business disputes. See id.
19. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). The
House Report accompanying the act clearly stated that the FAA would place
arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts, where it
belongs." Id. (citing H.R. RP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
20. See id. at 220 n.6 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)). The
explanation for judicial hostility towards arbitration comes from a centuries-old
rule, "rooted originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that
parties might not, by their agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the courts." See
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 18, at 283.
21. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 18, at 265.
22. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers
Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1187 (1993).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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ment.24 In Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,25
the Supreme Court noted that section 2 of the FAA evinced a
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. '26 This
position will come into play when we turn to our analysis of the
Gilmer decision.
B. Pre-Gilmer Case Law
Prior to the Court's decision in Gilmer, two competing lines
of arbitration cases had evolved.27 One line of cases held that a
collective bargaining agreement could not require mandatory
arbitration of civil rights claims. 28 The other line of cases
endorsed mandatory arbitration as a means to resolve commer-
cial disputes.2 9 One of the distinguishing factors between the
employment and commercial cases is that statutory civil rights
laws have been promulgated, at least in part, to protect interests
that we deem important to society.3 0 Thus, when a decision is
rendered on a civil rights claim, its effect is felt by society as a
whole. In contrast, decisions on commercial claims generally
affect only the parties to the litigation." This helps to explain
24. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (providing that "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.")
25. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
26. Id. at 24. The Court went on to note that "[tlhe Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ...." Id. at 24-25. See
also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). Section 3
of the FAA further demonstrates a liberal policy of favoring arbitration
agreements by requiring a stay of proceedings in any suit brought "in any of the
courts of the United States" if the suit is referable to arbitration under a
preexisting agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
27. See Jennifer A. Magyar, Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in
Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REv.
641, 642 (1992); Thomas Stewart, Note, Arbitrating Claims Under the Age
Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1991).
28. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding
that mandatory arbitration could not be imposed for claims brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding same for Fair Labor Standards Act);
McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding same for 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983). These cases are commonly referred to as the Gardner-Denver Trilogy.
29. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989). These cases are commonly known as the Mitsubishi Trilogy.
30. See Magyar, supra note 27, at 642-43.
31. See id.
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why the courts have adopted a liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements in the latter cases, while simultaneously dis-
couraging it in the former. With this in mind, we now turn to
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.3 2 and its progeny.
1. The Gardner-Denver Trilogy
In Gardner-Denver, the Court considered the relationship
between the federal courts, an arbitration provision found in a
collective bargaining agreement, and an individual's right to
equal employment opportunities under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.33 In Gardner-Denver, an African American, fol-
lowing his discharge, filed a grievance pursuant to an arbitration
clause found in the union's collective bargaining agreement.3 4
The employee claimed that his discharge resulted from racial dis-
crimination. 35 The arbitration clause provided that "[t]he deci-
sion of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the
Company, the Union, and any employee or employees
involved. '3 6 After the company rejected the employee's claim,
an arbitration hearing was held in which the arbitrator ruled that
the employee was discharged for cause.37 The employee then
filed suit under Title VII, and the company responded with a
motion for a summary judgment.3 s The district court granted,
and the court of appeals upheld, the company's motion and in
doing so held that the employee "voluntarily elected to pursue
his grievance to final arbitration ... [and thus] was bound by the
arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer
under Title VII." 39
32. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 702-18, 78 Stat. 257
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1994)).
34. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39. The grievance stated: "I feel I have
been unjustly discharged and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and
pay." Id.
35. See id. at 42. The company claimed that the discharge resulted from
Alexander's production of an excessive number of defective or unusable parts,
which had to be discarded. See id. at 38.
36. Id. at 40-41 n.3.
37. See id. at 42. Despite the claimant's belief that he was discharged as a
result of racial discrimination, he made no explicit claim of racial
discrimination in his grievance. The racial discrimination argument was first
raised in the final pre-arbitration step and later in testimony before the
arbitrator. The arbitrator's decision did not make any reference to Alexander's
claim of racial discrimination. See id.
38. See id. at 43.
39. Id. It should be noted that the arbitration clause in question
contained a nondiscrimination provision that stated "there shall be no
discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex,
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On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the employee
could still seek redress for his claim in federal court.4" The
Court noted that the lower courts must have based their decision
in part on the Supreme Court's prior cases that upheld the lib-
eral "federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes."41
Additionally, the Court noted that when an employee submits a
claim to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, he
seeks to vindicate a contractual right.42 In contrast, when an
employee brings a claim under Title VII, "an employee asserts
independent statutory rights accorded by Congress."4 Finally,
the Court examined the legislative history behind Title VII and
determined that it manifested "a congressional intent to allow an
individual" to vindicate federal and state rights in a judicial
forum.4 4
The second component of the Gardner-Denver Trilogy is Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.4 5 In Barrentine, a group
national origin, or ancestry." Id. at 39 (citing article five of the collective
bargaining agreement). Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees
on these same criteria. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
40. See id. at 60.
41. Id. at 46. The Court pointed to its prior holdings in the Steelworkers
Trilogy as the impetus for the lower court's decision. See United Steelworkers of
Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (holding that a court's role
as it relates to arbitration claims is limited to determining whether the party is
seeking a claim which is covered on the face of the agreement and that, if so,
the courts have "no business weighing the merits of the grievance."); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960) (holding that an order to arbitrate should "not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (holding that
the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator and that
"the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the
contract is different from his.").
42. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 49.
43. Id. at 49-50.
44. Id. at 48. The Court also noted:
[0] ther facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior
to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these
is the fact that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains
primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.... Moreover,
the fact finding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial fact finding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not
as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross examinations, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable.
Id. at 57-58.
45. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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of truck drivers, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
filed a grievance against their employer for failure to properly
compensate them.46 A committee of representatives from the
union and the company rejected the grievance without explana-
tion. 7 The employees then filed suit in the district and appellate
courts under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) .4' The lower
courts held that the employees voluntarily submitted their claims
to arbitration and thus were barred from asserting their statutory
wage claims because the "national labor policy encourages arbi-
tration of labor disputes. ' 49 The Supreme Court reversed and
held that wage claims under the FLSA were "not barred by the
prior submission of their grievances to the contractual-dispute
resolution procedures."5 ° The Court noted that FLSA was
enacted for the protection of covered workers from "substandard
wages and oppressive working hours."51 Thus, FLSA and Tide
VII were motivated by similar societal interests. In fact, the Court
cited Gardner-Denver throughout the opinion and drew the dis-
tinction between contractual and statutory causes of action.52
The final leg of the Gardner-Denver Trilogy is McDonald v.
West Branch.5" In McDonald, a police officer who had been dis-
charged filed a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining
46. See id. at 730-32. The collective bargaining agreement provided for
binding arbitration. See id. at 731. The claim for failure to properly
compensate arose from a company policy which required that when drivers
arrived at work, after doing some preliminary office work while being paid, they
were required to punch out and do their pre-trip safety inspection. If the
vehicles did not pass the inspection, they had to drive approximately 15-30
minutes to a repair facility while not being paid. This 15-30 minutes of unpaid
time was the subject of their claim. See id. at 730 n.1.
47. See id. at 731.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994).
49. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734.
50. Id. at 745.
51. Id. at 739.
52. See id. at 737. The Barrentine Court further noted that without a
judicial forum an employee's right to minimum wage and overtime pay may be
lost for two reasons. See id. at 742. First, a union, "without breaching its duty of
fair representation" may, in good faith, decide not to fully support the
employee's claim in arbitration. Id. The union, "balancing individual and
collective interests might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted
wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative expenditure of
resources would result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit
as a whole." Id. Second, the arbitrators may not have the expertise to handle
the complex question of whether employees' rights, vis-a-vis the statute, have
been violated. See id. at 743.
53. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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agreement that was in force between his union and the city.54
After the grievance procedure had been exhausted, the griev-
ance was taken to arbitration and the arbitrator ruled that the
police officer's discharge was for cause." The police officer,
without appealing the arbitrator's decision, brought suit in fed-
eral court, claiming that the police force had violated his rights
under section 198356 by discharging him for "exercising his First
Amendment rights.,5 7 The case was tried before a jury and a
verdict was returned in his favor.58 The court of appeals reversed
by finding that because the parties had agreed to settle their dis-
pute through arbitration and because the arbitrator had consid-
ered the reasons for the police officer's discharge, the arbitration
process was not abused. Therefore, the court held that the
claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.59
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the police officer's
section action was not barred because a federal court should not
afford res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration
proceeding.6 ° The Court began its analysis by stating that,
although the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute6" requires that
each court give full faith and credit to decisions rendered in
other courts, arbitration is not a judicial proceeding.6 2 The
Court then noted that in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, it had
previously held that an award in an arbitration proceeding,
brought pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, should
not preclude the individual or entity from vindicating his rights
54. See id. at 285-86. Although not mentioned anywhere in the decision,
the City of West Branch claimed that McDonald was fired for "taking indecent
liberties with a woman." Court Rules Arbitration Not Binding, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Apr. 18, 1984, at A9.
55. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 285-86.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
57. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 286. Specifically, the police officer alleged that
the city violated his rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association,
freedom to petition the government for redress, and deprivation of property
without due process of the law. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 286-87.
60. See id. at 287. The Court defined res judicata as "the effect of a
judgment on the merits in barring a subsequent suit between the same parties
or their privies that is based on the same claim." Id. at 287 n.5 (quoting
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). In defining
collateral estoppel, the Court stated "once a court has decided an issue of fact
or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case."
Id. (quoting Allen v. McCury, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
62. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 287-88.
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in a federal court.6" The Court further stated that in both of
those cases, its decision was "based in large part on our conclu-
sion that Congress intended the statutes at issue ... to be judi-
cially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an
adequate substitute for judicial proceedings . "..."64 Therefore,
because Congress intended section 1983 "to protect people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law," the Court rea-
soned that there was no doubt that Congress also intended sec-
tion 1983 to be judicially enforceable.6 5 The Court then, to
support its conclusion, discussed a series of policy considerations
that it had previously mentioned in whole or in part in Gardner-
Denver and Barrentine.
First, the Court noted that because the arbitrator's expertise
"pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land,"6 6 an arbitrator may not have the expertise that is required
to resolve complex legal issues.6" Second, because "an arbitra-
tor's authority derives solely from contract[,]" an arbitrator may
not have the authority to enforce civil rights claims.6" Third,
because the individual's and the union's interest are not always
similar, the union may not vigorously present the employee's
grievance.6 9 Finally, as noted in Gardner-Denver, because arbitra-
tion is designed to be cost-effective and expeditious, the fact-find-
ing process is not as complete as the process used in judicial fact
finding."y These four factors provide a good overview of the
63. See id. at 288-89.
64. Id. at 289.
65. See id. at 290. The Court stated that "although arbitration is well
suited to resolving contractual disputes . . . it cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and
constitutional fights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard." Id.
66. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974)).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 290 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728, 744 (1981)). The Court further noted: "[i]ndeed, when the rights
guaranteed by § 1983 conflict with the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, the arbitrator must enforce the agreement." Id. at 291. Finding
that despite the fact that an arbitrator may be competent to decide a certain
issue according to the statutes, it may still be beyond his power to do so, the
Court pointed out that an arbitrator's power comes solely from and is limited
by the contract between the parties. The Court further noted that if an
arbitrator bases the decision upon his view of the "requirements of enacted
legislation," rather than the requirements of the contract, then he has
exceeded his authority and the award will be unenforceable. Id. at 290-91
(citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))).
69. See id. at 291 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19; Barrentine, 450
U.S. at 742).
70. See id. (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58).
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Court's position vis-a-vis the Gardner-DenverTrilogy. The first, sec-
ond, and fourth factors have formed the bases for extensive dis-
cussion and controversy about whether mandatory arbitration is
appropriately applied to the nonunion setting as well. In light of
the Gardner-Denver Trilogy, we will now examine the Court's pos-
ture of upholding mandatory arbitration in the commercial con-
text as demonstrated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,71 and its progeny which has paved the way for the
Gilmer decision.
2. The Mitsubishi Trilogy
Prior to turning to Mitsubishi, however, a discussion of the
ruling in Wilko v. Swan,72 a 1953 Supreme Court case of particu-
lar relevance, is helpful because it reflected the Court's thinking
on mandatory arbitration at the time, which is contrary to its cur-
rent posture. In Wilko, a consumer brought a claim against a
brokerage firm in federal court under section 12 (2) of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933. 7s The firm moved to stay the trial under section
3 of the FAA because, pursuant to a pre-dispute agreement,74 the
parties had agreed to arbitrate all claims. 7' The district court
denied the stay and the court of appeals reversed.76  The
Supreme Court held that because Congress wanted to "assure
that sellers could not maneuver buyers into a position that might
weaken their ability to recover under the Securities Act," the pro-
vision in the agreement to waive vindication in a judicial forum
should not be upheld. 77 The Court noted that arbitrators, with-
out 'judicial instruction on the law," may not be able to conduct
"subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
71. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Mitsubishi is seen as the first in a series of
Supreme Court decisions that led up to the Court's decision in Gilmer. See
Malin & Ladenson, supra note 22 at 1203 n.73.
72. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
74. For a description of pre-dispute agreements and post-dispute
agreements, see infra note 77.
75. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429. See supra note 26 for an explanation of
section 3 of the FAA.
76. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
77. Id at 432-35. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements are different than
post-dispute arbitration agreements. In post-dispute agreements, the parties
waive the use of a judicial forum for a known dispute. Thus, they have an
opportunity to fully appreciate the ramifications of their actions. In pre-dispute
agreements, although the parties should contemplate the potential
ramifications of signing the agreement, they are not always able to fully
appreciate them. See Magyar, supra note 27, at 643 n.18.
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violator of the Act."7" Additionally, because arbitrators do not
maintain a "complete record" of the proceedings, substantive
judicial review would be impaired.79
Thirty years later, the Court decided the first case in the Mit-
subishi Trilogy. In Mitsubishi, two sophisticated entities (Mitsub-
ishi, a Japanese corporation, and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, an
American corporation) entered into a sales agreement for Soler
to distribute Mitsubishi manufactured automobiles.8 " The sales
agreement contained a provision that required the two parties to
submit all disputes to binding arbitration in Japan."' A dispute
arose, and Mitsubishi brought an action in federal court to com-
pel arbitration in accordance with the sales agreement.82 The
district court granted the motion and the court of appeals
reversed. 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
arbitration provision contained in the sales agreement was
enforceable for a claim arising under the antitrust laws.84 The
Court rejected Soler's argument that, as a matter of law, the arbi-
tration agreement must specifically mention the statute giving
rise to the claim that a party to the agreement seeks to arbi-
trate.8 5 The Court noted that the FAA's overriding purpose was
to guarantee the enforcement of private contractual agree-
ments.8 6 In essence, the Court was stating that the proper focus
is not the nature of the statutory claim itself, but rather the FAA's
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."87 The
78. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36.
79. See id. at 436.
80. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 617 (1985).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 618.
83. See id. at 621, 623.
84. See id. at 625-26. Soler's counterclaim was that Mitsubishi had violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7e (1994). See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at
620-21.
85. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624-25. The Court noted that "we find no
warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a
presumption against arbitration of statutory claims." Id. at 625.
86. See id. at 625. The Court reasoned:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
Id. at 628.
87. Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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Court observed that if Congress had intended for the statute to
be free from waiver of the right of a judicial forum, it would be
"deducible from the text or the legislative history" of the stat-
ute.88 The Court went on to note the importance of arbitration
as it relates to international agreements.
89
Additionally, the Court rejected Soler's argument that
because anti-trust issues are complex and require "sophisticated
legal and economic analysis," they are ill-suited for arbitration-
noting that "adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of
arbitration."9 Finally, because the national courts will still have
an opportunity, at the award-enforcement stage, to ensure that
the legitimate interest of antitrust laws has been addressed, the
Court reasoned that mandatory arbitration of antitrust claims will
still be an effective mechanism to protect the societal interest of a
competitive national economy, which is the alleged goal of the
Sherman Act.91
The Court built upon the first leg of the Mitsubishi Trilogy
two years later in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.92 In
McMahon, customers of a brokerage firm brought suit alleging
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) 9" and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)."
The customers had signed a brokerage agreement that contained
a provision requiring arbitration of any controversy. 95 When the
customer attempted to bypass arbitration, the brokerage firm,
pursuant to the FAA,96 moved to compel arbitration of the
claims.97 The district court held that the SEA claim should be
subjected to arbitration because of the "strong national policy
88. Id. at 628.
89. See id. at 629. Justice Blackmun stated, "[t ] he expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if... we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. Id.
(quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
90. Id. at 633.
91. See id. at 635-638.
92. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994). The customers alleged that Rule lOb-
5 of the SEA was violated. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. Rule lOb-5 is codified
in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
95. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. The agreement stated that "[u]nless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my account ... shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules, then in effect . . . ." Id.
96. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). This was the same provision utilized by the
defendant in Mitsubishi.
97. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
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favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.""8 The
lower court held, however, that the RICO claim was not arbitra-
ble because of society's strong interest in the federal policies
underlying RICO.99 The court of appeals affirmed on the RICO
claim but reversed the SEA claim.1 °°
The Supreme Court, in a highly divided opinion, held that
both claims were arbitrable because of a strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration.10' However, this presumption in favor of
arbitration could be defeated if the party opposing arbitration
could demonstrate a Congressional intent to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum for the statutory rights at issue. 10 2 The Court was
unable to discern any such congressional intent to preclude
waiver of the judicial forum in either the text, legislative history,
or purpose of the SEA or RICO. In the alternative, the custom-
ers attempted to argue that, according to the Court's holding in
Wilko, there was a judicial mistrust of arbitration and thus, the
judicial forum should not be waived.'0 3 Although the Court did
not overrule Wilko, the Court did note that the judicial mistrust
of arbitration had eroded and that many of the reasons given in
Wilko were subsequently rejected.'0 4
The final case of the Mitsubishi Trilogy is Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. .*0 In Rodriguez de Quijas, a
group of investors signed a standard customer agreement to arbi-
98. Id. at 224 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213
(1985)).
99. See id.
100. See id. The court of appeals said that the public policy
considerations of RICO made the application of the FAA "inappropriate" and
thus RICO claims should only be adjudicated in a judicial forum. See id. As to
the SEA claim, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Wilko, the court of
appeals was bound by precedent. See id. at 225.
101. See id. at 238, 242. The Court noted that in keeping with the holding
in Mitsubishi, "we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals, should
inhibit enforcement [of controversies based on statutes]." Id. at 226 (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27
(1985)) (citation omitted).
102. See id. at 226-27.
103. See id. at 231. The investors pointed to the following grounds for a
distrust of the arbitral process: (1) arbitration proceedings were not suited to
cases requiring subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of the
alleged violator; (2) arbitrators must make legal determinations withoutjudicial
instruction on the law; (3) an arbitration award may be made without
explanation of the arbitrator's reasons and without a complete record of the
proceedings; and (4) the power to vacate an award is limited. See id. (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953)).
104. See id. at 231-32.
105. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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trate any controversy that arose, unless the investors' agreement
with the broker-dealer was unenforceable under federal or state
law.1" 6  When their investment turned sour, the investors
brought suit alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the SEA.10 7 The district court ordered all claims were submitted
to arbitration except for the Securities Act claims, because those
were held to be non-arbitrable according to Wilko.' °8 The court
of appeals reversed the Securities Act claim, concluding that the
Court's subsequent decisions rendered Wilko obsolete."°9
The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision,"' overruled
Wilko and held the agreement to arbitrate enforceable."' The
Court noted that Wilko was pervaded by the "old judicial hostility
to arbitration,"'" 2 which had recently been eroded in McMahon
and Mitsubishi."3 Therefore, to allow Wilko and McMahon to
exist side-by-side would be problematic because the Securities Act
and the SEA should be read "harmoniously.""' 4 Additionally, the
Court noted that because the FAA evinces a strong policy favor-
ing arbitration, the party opposing arbitration must carry the
burden of demonstrating that Congress intended, in a separate
106. See id. at 478.
107. See id. at 479. The Securities Act was also at issue in Wilko. In
McMahon, however, the SEA was at issue.
108. See id. at 479.
109. See id.
110. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the majority, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White, and Scalia joined.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined. The dissent noted that because Congress did not amend
the Securities Act during the previous thirty-five years (since the Wilko
decision), the Court should respect Congress' intent to let Wilko stand, much as
the Court expects other courts to follow its decisions. See id. at 486. Justice
Stevens went on to note:
In the final analysis, ajustice's vote in a case like this depends more on
his or her views about the respective lawmaking responsibilities of
Congress and this Court than on conflicting policy interests. Judges
who have confidence in their own ability to fashion public policy are
less hesitant to change the law than those of us who are inclined to
give wide latitude to the views of the voters' representatives on non-
constitutional matters.
Id. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This statement is truly remarkable when you consider that Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan and Blackmun, who have traditionally applied the tools of rea-
son and justice to 'interpret' the law rather than strictly adhering to the text of
a statute, joined in the opinion.
111. See id. at 485.
112. Id. at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.)).
113. See id. at 480-81.
114. Id. at 484.
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statute, to preclude waiver of the judicial alternative."1 5 The
Court thus had come full circle since its decision in Wilko.
As mentioned above, the Court had originally adopted two
separate positions in relation to the arbitrability of statutory
claims. If a dispute arose that required arbitration as the result
of a collective bargaining agreement also implicated statutory
civil rights, the Court appeared willing to preserve the judicial
forum. In contrast, if a dispute arose that required arbitration as
part of a commercial agreement and that agreement implicated
statutory commercial rights, the Court would uphold the FAA's
liberal policy favoring arbitration unless Congress had demon-
strated an intent to preserve the judicial forum. From the back-
ground of these two distinct lines of cases came Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'1 6 a case involving a dispute both
requiring arbitration pursuant to a commercial agreement and
implicating statutory civil rights. It is to Gilmer that we now turn.
II. GILMER v INVTERSTA TE/JOTNSON LANE CORP.
Gilmer, a broker-dealer in his 50's, was hired by Interstate/
Johnson as a manager in May of 1981.17 As a condition of
employment, Gilmer was required to register with several stock
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 118
The registration application Gilmer signed with the NYSE pro-
vided for mandatory arbitration of any controversy that may arise
between Gilmer and Interstate/Johnson." t9 Interstate/Johnson
terminated Gilmer's employment in 1987, at which time he was
sixty-two years old. 12° Gilmer filed a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and then brought suit
against Interstate/Johnson in federal district court.121 Inter-
state/Johnson subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration
as required under the terms of the arbitration agreement con-
115. See id. at 483.
116. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
117. See id. at 23.
118. See id.
119. See id. The registration application provided that the rules,
constitution, and by-laws of the organizations with which Gilmer registered
would determine whether a particular controversy was arbitrable. See id. At
issue was NYSE Rule 347, which provided for arbitration of "any controversy
between a registered representative and any member or member organization
arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative." Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. Gilmer claimed that Interstate/Johnson had discriminated
against him based on age, in violation the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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tained in Gilmer's registration application with the NYSE.' 2 2 The
district court denied Interstate/Johnson's motion'23 and the
court of appeals reversed. 124 Because of a split among the cir-
cuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 25
Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority.126 The
Court began its analysis by briefly recapping the purpose and
intent behind the FAA. 127 Justice White noted that several amici
curiae in support of Gilmer argued that the FAA excludes from
its reach "all contracts of employment.' 1 28 However, the Court
noted that this was not a case involving a contract for employ-
ment because the arbitration clause was contained in the regis-
tration application with the NYSE and not in the agreement with
Interstate/Johnson.129
Justice White then cited Mitsubishi and noted that just
because a litigant agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim he does not
waive his rights afforded by the statute. Rather, he merely agrees
to their resolution through arbitration.3 Additionally, once a
party agrees to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress has indicated an intent, to be determined from the text
or legislative history of a statute or inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statute, to preserve a judicial forum.'31 Jus-
tice White also noted that the party seeking to avoid arbitration
must bear the burden of demonstrating Congress' intent to pre-
clude waiver of the judicial forum.'32
122. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
123. See id. The district court based its decision on the Supreme Court's
decision in Gardner-Denver and because, in its opinion, "[C] ongress intended to
protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum." Id. (citation
omitted).
124. See id. The court of appeals noted that "nothing in the text,
legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA [indicates] a
congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id.
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir.
1990)).
125. See id.
126. Joining Justice White in the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice Stevens
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
127. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying
text for an overview of the FAA.
128. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
131. See id. (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)).
132. Id. The placing of the burden on the party seeking to avoid
arbitration can be traced back to the Court's decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
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The Court observed, and Gilmer conceded, that nothing in
the text of the ADEA, nor in its legislative history, indicated an
intent to preserve the judicial forum. 3 Therefore, for Gilmer to
prevail, he had to demonstrate that "compulsory arbitration of
ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration agreements would be incon-
sistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the
ADEA"-'
3 4
In support of his position that such an inconsistency did
exist, Gilmer advanced five general arguments. First, Gilmer
contended that "the ADEA is designed not only to address indi-
vidual grievances, but also to further important social poli-
cies." '' In response, the Court noted that, although arbitration
involves specific disputes, as does judicial resolution, both of
these mechanisms can further social policy."l 6 The Court was
also not persuaded by Gilmer's second contention that "arbitra-
tion would undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the
ADEA."' 13 7 The Court noted that an individual would still be able
to file a claim with the EEOC, and because the EEOC has
"independent authority to investigate age discrimination," the
EEOC would not be dependent upon the filing of the charge in
order to commence its investigation.'
Justice White then dismissed Gilmer's third contention that
"compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claim-
ants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA."' 9 Justice
White reasoned that "Congress did not explicitly preclude arbi-
tration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims."14 Gilmer's
fourth contention, regarding the inconsistency of mandatory
arbitration with the purposes of the ADEA, will be discussed
slightly out of order because of its deep social policy concerns.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), which stated that under the
FAA, "the party opposing arbitration carries the burden of showing that
Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies, or that such a waiver ofjudicial remedies inherently conflicts with the
underlying purposes of that other statute." Id. at 483.
133. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 28. Justice White noted that "[s]o long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate (his or her) statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637) (alteration in original).
137. Id. at 28.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Id.
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Turning next to Gilmer's fifth contention, he asserted that
because there will often be "unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees," the Court should refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements relating to the ADEA."' However, the
Court noted that "mere inequality" in bargaining power is not
dispositive.' 4 2 Justice White noted that an inequality in bargain-
ing power "is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment con-
text." '4 3 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that arbitration agree-
ments can be voided when they are entered into as the result of
"the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.' ' ' 14 4 The
Court further noted that in this case, Gilmer was an experienced
business man and there was a lack of evidence to indicate that he
was "coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration
clause." 1 4
5
Gilmer's fourth and most critical line of argument to
advance his contention that arbitration is inconsistent with the
purposes of the ADEA put forth a "host of challenges to the ade-
quacy of arbitration procedures." '4 6 Gilmer first argued that
arbitration panels may be biased.'4 7 Justice White responded to
this by noting that Gilmer's argument was nothing more than a
mere presumption. He further pointed out that the NYSE rules
governing arbitration provide ample protections against biased
panels. 4 ' Gilmer next maintained that the discovery which is
allowed in arbitration is much more limited than the discovery
allowed in federal courts, thus making it more difficult to prove
discrimination.' 4 9 The Court responded to this by noting that it
is unlikely that age discrimination claims require more extensive
discovery than those that have previously been upheld by the
141. Id. at 33.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 30. Many of the factors that are advanced by Gilmer are
similar to or identical with prior contentions that had previously been
addressed by the Court.
147. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
148. See id. For example, the parties may inquire as to the arbitrator's
background and employment histories. See id. Additionally, each party is
allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. See id.
Finally, the FAA protects against bias by allowing courts to overturn arbitration
decisions "where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."
Id. (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(b)) (1994).
149. See id. at 31.
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Court, but in any case, Gilmer had not demonstrated that the
NYSE discovery provisions were inadequate.15 ° The Court noted
that a further counterweight to the limited discovery is that an
arbitrator is not bound by the rules of evidence.' Gilmer's
third point was that because arbitrators do not render written
opinions, there will be a lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory practices and a stifling of the development of the
law.' 52 The Court easily overcame this point by noting that the
NYSE rules do require that all arbitration awards be in writing.153
Gilmer further argued that arbitration cannot "further the pur-
poses of the ADEA" because arbitration procedures do not pro-
vide for broad equitable relief and class actions.' 5 4 As with the
last argument, the Court noted that NYSE rules do allow for the
fashioning of equitable relief.'55 Additionally, the EEOC may
bring action seeking class-wide and equitable relief.' 6 There-
fore, Gilmer's attempt to impeach the arbitration of ADEA
claims as being against public policy, as well as his attempt to
demonstrate that arbitration of ADEA claims was inconsistent
with the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA, had
failed.
Asserting one additional, final argument, Gilmer contended
that the Court's decisions in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and
McDonald all preclude arbitration of employment discrimination
cases. 157 In response, the Court distinguished Gilmer from those
cases by noting that those cases involved a collective bargaining
agreement and thus dealt with an employee's contractual rights
rather than an employee's statutory rights. 5 ' The Court also
150. See id. Justice White also noted that by agreeing to arbitration, a
litigant "trades the procedures and opportunity for the review of the courtroom
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id. (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. In addition, the NYSE rules required that arbitration awards
"contain the names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a
description of the award issued." Id. at 31-32.
154. Id. at 32.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 33.
158. See id. at 34 Justice White noted that the collective bargaining cases
did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of
statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their
statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such
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noted that those cases were not decided under the FAA, which
reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements."
159
In dissent, Justice Stevens chided the majority for failing to
consider the antecedent question of whether "the coverage of
the Act even extends to arbitration clauses contained in employ-
ment contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at
issue." 16° Justice Stevens took the position that arbitration
clauses contained in employment contracts are exempt from the
scope of the FAA.16 In response to the majority's claim that Gil-
mer did not involve an employment contract because the arbitra-
tion provision existed in the registration agreement with the
NYSE, Justice Stevens noted that registration with the NYSE was a
condition of employment and thus for all practical purposes was
within the scope of the FAA exclusion of "contracts of
employment.1
6 2
Additionally, Justice Stevens would have sustained Gilmer's
argument that "compulsory arbitration conflicts with the con-
gressional purpose animating the ADEA . .,""' Justice Stevens
noted that the ADEA authorizes courts to award broad class-
based injunctive relief, while commercial arbitration is "typically
limited to a specific dispute."' 64 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
noted that "to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimina-
tion to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the
courts" would be inconsistent with a statute that was designed to
claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude
subsequent statutory actions. See id. at 35.
159. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
160. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 24 for the text of the
relevant section of the FAA that appears to limit the scope of the FAA.
161. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
looked to the legislative history behind the FAA and determined that the
primary motivation for the enactment of the FAA was "the perceived need by
the business community to overturn the common-law rule that denied specific
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in contracts between business entities."
Id. at 39. Thus, perjustice Stevens, the true purpose behind the FAA was not to
encompass arbitration agreements between the employer and employee, but
rather to facilitate the enforcement of agreements between two sophisticated
business entities.
162. Id. at 40. Justice Stevens stated, "[I]n my opinion the exclusion in
§ 1 should be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate
disputes with the employer arising out of the employment relationship,
particularly where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment."
Id.
163. Id. at 41.
164. Id. at 42.
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enforce civil rights.165 In conclusion, Justice Stevens noted that
the Court's decision overlooked the inequality in bargaining
power between an individual and an entire industry.166
III. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY GIL.4wER
As discussed below in Part IV, courts were quickly asked to
expand Gilmer, arguably beyond its original intent. The lower
courts have responded by liberally applying mandatory arbitra-
tion to statutory employment disputes. The trend was predict-
able in light of the notion of the liberal federal policy in favor of
arbitration. Before discussing these developments, however, it is
illuminating to examine the questions glossed over and evaded
by the Court, some of which the lower courts have addressed. As
stated earlier, in Gilmer, the Court held that a statutory civil rights
claim, arising out of a written agreement contained in a registra-
tion application that an employee was required to fill out as a
condition of employment, could be subjected to mandatory arbi-
tration. The Court, to support its holding, pointed to the afore-
mentioned "liberal federal policy"'6 7 as evinced by the FAA along
with a lack of identifiable congressional intent to preserve the
judicial forum. However, in resolving Gilmer, the Court failed to
answer the antecedent question of whether the FAA even applies
to "contracts of employment.""16 Justice White was able to get
165. Id. (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
166. See id. at 43.
167. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).
168. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. The question of
whether the FAA applies to contracts of employment is the subject of three
different theories. See Cheryl Blackwell Bryson & Anurag Gulati, The Courts and
Legislature Begin to Adopt ADR Methods to Deal With Growing Number of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 13 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 221 (1993). One theory posed is that
the section 1 exclusion comes into play only when workers are engaged in the
transportation of goods in interstate commerce. The basis of this theory, which
has been accepted by courts pre- and post-Gilmer, is that only two specific classes
of workers are listed in the exclusion, namely seamen and railroad workers.
The general category of "any other workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" must also relate to other workers whose jobs involve the interstate
transport of goods. See id. at 236 (citing Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
911 (1957); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1972); DiCrisi v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
A second theory advanced, which has been endorsed by some courts and
some Justices of the Supreme Court, is that the section 1 exclusion of "workers
engaged in foreign and interstate commerce" referred to all employment
contracts. See id. at 237. This theory enjoys limited legislative historical support
as demonstrated in the dissenting opinion ofJustice Stevens in Gilmer, in which
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around the FAA exclusion for "contracts of employment"169 by
noting that (1) the issue of the scope of the section 1 exclusion
was not raised by the parties below, and (2) the writing that con-
tained the arbitration agreement was not in a contract with Inter-
state/Johnson but rather in a registration application that
Gilmer filled out with the NYSE.
In response to Justice White's first point, it should be noted
that the Court has on many past occasions considered issues that
were either waived or not considered by the parties below,1 7 °
when the issues were "so integral to the decision of the case that
they could be considered 'fairly subsumed' by the actual question
presented.""1 7 In the Gilmer case, it would appear that before the
Court could make the determination that the FAA's liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration dictates a certain result, the deter-
he quoted the statement of the chairman of the ABA committee which drafted
the bill when speaking before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee: "[The bill] is
not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act
to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it." Id. (quoting
Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923)).
The third theory of the meaning of section 1, which has not received favor
by the courts, is the view that the purpose of the exclusion was to respond to the
concerns of organized labor by excluding bargaining agreements. The genesis
of this concern appears to have come from labor leaders' fear that imposed
arbitration was a threat to the right of their membership to strike with respect
to interest disputes. See id. at 238 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of
Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI-KENT L. REv. 753, 757-60 (1990)
(favoring the latter theory)).
169. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text for a brief overview of
the FAA.
170. For a similar handling by the Court of issues presumed to have been
waived, see, for example, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (deciding the
petitioner's fair cross-section claim, which was not raised by the petitioner, but
rather by an amicus brief); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (despite an
apparently intentional failure to raise an equal protection argument by the
petitioner, the court reached and decided the case based upon that argument,
going so far as to completely disregard the petitioner's actual argument, which
was based on the Sixth Amendment and focused only on the equal protection
argument); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961) (stating that "[a]lthough
appellant chose to urge what may have appeared to be the surer ground for
favorable disposition and did not insist that Wolf be overruled, the amicus curiae,
who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument, did urge the Court
to overrule Wolf). See also R. STERN, E. GREssMAN, & S. SHARPIRO, SUPREME
COURTPRACTjcIG, § 6.26 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing the rule which requires that
a party present a question in a lower court prior to bringing it up on appeal and
the exceptions to that rule).
171. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mination of whether the FAA applies at all would clearly be an
antecedent question. 7 2
The Court's second determination, that the FAA section 1
exclusion does not apply because the clause to arbitrate was not
contained in a "contract of employment" between Gilmer and
Interstate/Johnson, clearly exalts form over substance. To work
in the securities industry, it was necessary for Gilmer to complete
a registration application with the various exchanges. Had Gil-
mer failed to complete the registration application with the
NYSE, he would not have been able to work for either Interstate/
Johnson or any other brokerage house. Thus, completion of the
registration application was clearly a condition of employment
that arose out of the employment relationship.173 Because the
registration application was a condition of employment, the
Court should have considered it to be a part of the "contract of
employment" and thus should have focused on the antecedent
question of whether the FAA even applies to arbitration clauses
contained in contracts of employment. 174
Despite what appears to be a clear intention on the part of
the Court to bring mandatory arbitration into the fold as a dis-
pute resolution mechanism of statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims, a number of lingering questions of great significance
were not touched by Gilmer. One such question is whether the
EEOC can bring cases on behalf of employees who are covered
by mandatory arbitration agreements. The EEOC has adopted a
policy regarding the use of ADR pursuant to the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act 175 and the National Performance Review.
Under this policy, the agency has taken the position that while it
is firmly committed to using ADR mechanisms as a means of
resolving employment discrimination disputes, it is not bound by
any agreements of the type found in Gilmer. The EEOC's pro-
nouncement of this policy came on the heels of a federal district
judge's preliminary injunction of an employer's use of a
mandatory ADR policy, which the court deemed unfair in EEOC
v. River Oaks Imaging Diagnostics (ROID) .176
172. Justice Stevens noted: "I believe that the Court should reach the
issue of the coverage of the FAA to employment disputes because resolution of
the question is so clearly antecedent to the disposition of this case." Id. at 36-37.
173. See infra note 162.
174. See Magyar, supra note 27, at 653.
175. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991); Exec. Order
No. 12,871, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,201 (1993).
176. 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995). In River Oaks, the
federal district court enjoined the employer from "requiring any present or
future employees . . . to enter into any ADR policy which would cause an
employee to pay the costs of ADR proceedings; [or] preclude or interfere with
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The Court's decision in Gilmer also raises a significant public
policy question: whether civil rights claims are best served by a
judicial or arbitral proceeding. At the outset, this can be viewed
as a freedom of contract question. Should two informed adults
(or as is probably more accurate a corporation and an adult) be
allowed to determine the terms of conditions of their employ-
ment prior to entering into that relationship? On the surface,
the answer to this question would appear to be yes. When parties
agree to form an employment relationship, they consider factors
such as hours, compensation, benefits, and expectations of the
job. Against this backdrop, it would appear that two consenting
adults should also legally be able to decide the method for resolv-
ing any disputes that may arise during the term of the employ-
ment relationship.
However, it is important to understand the purpose behind
civil rights legislation. When Congress promulgates laws to pro-
tect civil rights, Congress is not only concerned with the fate of
particular individuals, but also with the classes of people that
deserve protection from abuses by the majority or big business.
In other words, even though Title VII focused on minority rights
initially, Congress' primary concern is with society as a whole. In
this light, it becomes important to ask a second question: can a
system based on arbitration as its terminal procedure-a proce-
dure that is designed to assist in the enforcement of business
agreements and settle individual grievances-foster the congres-
sional intent behind legislation, such as the ADEA and Title VII,
and thus adequately protect society's interest? The qualified
answer to this question is no, unless certain due process protec-
tions are included in the system. As the Court noted in McDon-
ald, "[arbitration] cannot provide an adequate substitute for a
judicial proceeding in protecting federal statutory and constitu-
tional rights .... "177 Mandatory arbitration fails to protect soci-
ety's interest for the following reasons: (1) the inequality in
bargaining power between the employer and prospective
employee; (2) the lack of adequate discovery procedures that are
any employee's right to file complaints with the EEOC or promptly file a suit in
court .... Id. at *4. Further, the employer was also enjoined from "retaliating
against any past or present employee . .. who files a complaint with the EEOC
or because of that employee's opposition to mandatory ADR Policy . . . ." Id.
The court determined that the employer's "so called 'ADR Policy'" was "so
misleading and against the principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that its use violated such law." Id.
177. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984). See also
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (noting that the
resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is primarily the responsibility of
the courts).
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essential to prove instances of discrimination; (3) the lack of
legal training possessed by arbitrators; and (4) the lack of a
mechanism for social vindication.
1. Unequal Bargaining Power
Let us first turn to the issue of unequal bargaining power
between an employer and ajob applicant. From early childhood,
we as a society learn one more rule that is painfully obvious for
many of us-"he who has the gold makes the rules." Responding
to Gilmer's contention that there "often will be unequal bargain-
ing power between employers and employees" when entering
into an employment relationship,' 78 the Gilmer majority dis-
missed this problem by noting that mere inequality in bargaining
power is not a sufficient reason to hold arbitration agreements
unenforceable in the employment context.179 The Court then
went on to cite Mitsubishi and Rodriguez de Quijas in stating that
although inequality may exist, agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable. However, the Mitsubishi Trilogy cases dealt with dis-
putes arising in the business context that involved parties of rela-
tively equal bargaining power, 8 ° involving at least the power to
enter into a business relationship with another entity should they
not like the terms of the proposed relationship.
In contrast, the relationship between an employer and a pro-
spective job applicant simply does not involve the same type of
mutual power shared between a buyer and a seller. As to where a
seller in a business context may take his product and sell else-
where, a prospective job applicant, especially in a tight job mar-
ket, cannot just take his labor and sell it to another bidder. This
would seem especially true in a case like Gilmer, in which the job
applicant was an older person who presumably would be quali-
fied by experience to work primary in the securities industry and
perhaps in a limited number of other fields.'81 The Court had
previously recognized the importance of the unequal bargaining
power between an employer and a prospective employee. In
178. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1991).
179. See id. at 33.
180. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
181. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. Rv. 83, 156-57 (1996). Professor Ware notes that outside the
securities industry, an employee can seek employment with other employers
within that industry if the employer makes arbitration a non-negotiable
condition of employment. However, in the securities industry, an employee will
not be able to find an employer for which to work without the arbitration
clause.
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Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,'82 Justice
White noted that "employers might be able to use superior bar-
gaining power to coerce employees to ... waive their protection
under the Act."18 In Perry v. Thomas,' 84justice O'Connor, in dis-
sent, observed that the state legislature intended to "protect the
worker from the exploitative employer who would demand that a
prospective employee sign away in advance his right to resort to
the judicial system for redress of an employment grievance. 185
Furthermore, Congress itself has recognized that an employer
has substantially greater bargaining power than does an
employee seeking to put food on the family table. When Con-
gress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, for example, it noted
that "the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of
labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment ..... 186 Clearly, the Court and Congress both
understood prior to Gilmer that the unequal bargaining power
between an employer and prospective applicant was significant.
Nonetheless, the court is not willing to allow employees to extri-
cate themselves from these agreements resulting from unequal
power. The Court noted that courts should look into claims that
an agreement to arbitrate was produced by fraud or overwhelm-
ing economic power.187 However, it is evident that the Court
does not consider the economic power held by the securities
182. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
183. Id. at 302 (holding that a waiver of rights under the Fair Labor
Standards Act was contrary to public policy).
184. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
185. Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 131 (1973)).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Some have suggested that the way to
eliminate the problematic question of voluntariness in the pre-employment
agreement is simply to have employees enter into such agreements once they
are employed, as a condition of continued employment. This method is
fraught with problems from the tinge of coercion to the strong smell of
retaliation for those employees who refuse to sign such agreements. At least
one court has dealt quickly and taken an extraordinary step to protect
employees from the use by an employer of a post-employment, in-house ADR
tool that seemed more like a sword against employees. See EEOC v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostics, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995). The court's
ruling in River Oaks suggests the importance of clearly communicating to and
certainly not misleading employees regarding any ADR policy adopted.
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that an employer against whom a number of
discrimination suits have been filed runs the risk of being accused of unfairly
changing the conditions, if it thereafter institutes a mandatory binding
arbitration policy even with the inherent defects of employment for punitive
reasons and retaliation against the workforce in general.
187. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
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industry as a whole to be overwhelming as compared to that of a
prospective job applicant. Thus, it is difficult to imagine circum-
stances where the Court would consider one party to have exer-
cised overwhelming economic power.
This imbalance of bargaining power takes on a particularly
destructive nature when the employee is a newly-hired employee
or worse yet, just ajob applicant. Pre-hire arbitration agreements
often appear in the application for employment or they are
presented to a newly-hired employee as a condition for employ-
ment and on a "take it or leave it" basis.' 88 Herein lies the prob-
lem: at the moment of hire the new employee lacks almost all
bargaining power because of the need for employment.189 It is
the need for employment which leads the new employee to sign
the arbitration agreement even though the employee may not
wish to. More often than not, the employee signs the contract
without the ability to consult an attorney prior to signing. These
pre-hire arbitration agreements have been likened to the labor
law concept of the "yellow-dog contracts," wherein the employer
makes the employee promise not to join a union as a condition
of employment. The current-day "yellow-dog" contract entails
forcing employees to waive their statutory rights in order to get
the job."9 ° For instance, in Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris,19 1
a job applicant was handed an arbitration agreement that stated
"you will not be offered employment until [the arbitration agree-
ment] is signed without modification." '92 The employee argued
that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and the Pony
Express court still found the agreement enforceable.
The question of power imbalance becomes even more pro-
nounced when compounded by instances in which the issues of
race, gender, disability, and disadvantaged socio-economic posi-
tion are superimposed upon the problem. Because of historical
patterns of discrimination, including prejudicial stereotypes and
unequal bargaining power, these employees who are already on
188. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REv. 1017,
1037 (1996) (citing COMMISSION ON THE FuTuP.E OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF LABOR & COMMERCE, FACT-FINDING REPORT 118
(1994)).
189. See id. at 1036.
190. See id. at 1037 n.146 (explaining that such contracts were prevalent
in the early twentieth century and were approved by the Supreme Court in
Hitchmen Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 299 (1917) and Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915)). Such contracts were declared unenforceable in section 3 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)).
191. 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App. 1996).
192. Id. at 819.
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unequal footing with the employer, will have the "civil rights rug
ofjustice" snatched further from beneath them unless the courts
are diligent in preserving due process protections.
2. Lack of Discovery
A second concern invoked by mandatory arbitration is with
the lack of discovery afforded to the parties, especially when the
parties are attempting to prove discrimination. Gilmer argued
that the discovery allowed in arbitration is more limited than that
allowed in the federal courts.19 The Court responded that it is
unlikely that age discrimination claims require more discovery
than other claims that had been found to be arbitrable.' How-
ever, at least one commentator has noted that proving a "discrim-
ination case in the absence of full discovery would be particularly
problematic.""19  Thirty years ago, discrimination was overt.
Some employers even admitted that they were excluding certain
groups from consideration of employment or using different pay
scales. However, today discrimination is more subtle. Without
the ability to gain access to information, it may be very difficult, if
not impossible, for an employee to prove that he or she has been
the subject of discrimination. As Professor Cooper has noted,
without full discovery, what can the arbitrator know?
196
3. Arbitrators' Qualifications
A third concern revolves around the qualifications of arbi-
trators who decide these disputes based on statutory rights. The
lack of adequate training possessed by some arbitrators in the
specific statutes to be interpreted potentially poses numerous
problems. Although the current cadre of arbitrators are gener-
193. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
194. See id.
195. Christine Godsil Cooper, Where are We Going with Gilmer?-Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 203, 218 (1992). Cooper has noted:
Determining an employment discrimination case in the absence of full
discovery would be particularly problematic. It would be impossible in
a disparate impact case. The disparate impact case is rare in any
event, and probably unheard of in arbitration. But the ordinary
disparate treatment case requires the presentation of similarly situated
non-class members in order to determine whether or not
discrimination occurred. Proof of discrimination on the basis of race,
for example, requires proof that similarly situated members of
another race were treated better. Without full prehearing discovery,
what can the arbitrator know?
Id.
196. See id.
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ally well-versed in labor and commercial disputes, they are not
normally as well-versed in civil rights litigation. In Gardner-Den-
ver, the Court noted that civil ri hts statutes often require "refer-
ence to public law concepts."19 In contrast, Professor Cooper
has noted that while a labor arbitrator only has the authority to
interpret and apply the contract at issue, commercial arbitrators
have broad authority to interpret and resolve statutory issues."'
Nevertheless, Professor Cooper goes on to note that "an arbitra-
tor who is limited in knowledge of or respect for the law cannot
do justice." '199
Additionally, as the Court noted in Barrentine, a large
number of arbitrators are not even lawyers.200 Yet, resolution of
statutory and constitutional claims frequently requires reference
to legislative history and prior case law.20 1 Furthermore, an arbi-
trator is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, an arbi-
trator's decision may run contrary to a long-developed legal
doctrine. This may also result in a situation in which potential
employers are unaware of the law and as such are unable to plan
to obey the law.
An additional concern is the possibility of the lack of a writ-
ten opinion to support the arbitrator's decision. The fact that a
written opinion is not necessarily required leads to two problems.
First, without knowing the basis of an arbitrator's decision, other
potential litigants cannot know what action is considered accept-
able and what action is not. Employers will thus be unable to rely
on legal precedent as a factor to consider when determining how
to treat current and potential employees or otherwise determine
whether certain actions were in compliance with the law. Addi-
tionally, any future wronged employees would be unsure whether
an inflicted wrong would be actionable. Finally, without written
decisions, the arbitrators themselves will not have the appropri-
ate guidance as cases develop that are not necessarily appealed to
the lower courts.
197. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
198. See Cooper, supra note 195, at 212.
199. Id.; see also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57 (noting that arbitrators'
expertise "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.").
200. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743
(1981). The Barrentine Court went on to note that "[a]lthough an arbitrator
may be competent to resolve preliminary factual questions ... he may lack the
competence to decide the ultimate legal issue . . . ." Id.
201. While both legislative history and prior case law are no doubt very
difficult for the average layperson to interpret, it is not necessary to ensure that
all arbitrators are lawyers, just that the arbitrators know the law, are able to
apply it to the facts of the case at hand, and render well-reasoned decisions.
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Second, the lack of a written opinion makes it very difficult
for a court to review an arbitrator's decision to determine if the
proceeding has been infused with bias.2" 2 The FAA allows arbi-
tration awards to be vacated for a "manifest disregard of the
law."2 ° However, if an arbitrator can make a decision on a statu-
tory civil rights issue without rendering an opinion, then how can
a reviewing court ever adequately determine whether there has
been a manifest disregard for the law? Furthermore, when one
stops to consider that many times the arbitrator who has been
chosen will be one familiar to the industry as a whole, the lack of
a written opinion will make it difficult for a reviewing court to
determine what role bias played, if any, in the arbitration
decision.2 °4
A recent federal appellate court decision in DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. 2°5 demonstrates the narrow grounds on
which arbitration awards are reviewed. In DiRussa, the Second
Circuit refused to vacate or modify the award where the arbitra-
tors had ruled that the company had discriminated against the
plaintiff on the basis of his age, but the arbitrators did not award
the plaintiff the almost $250,000 in attorneys' fees to which he
was entitled under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). The court ruled that there was no requisite showing
that the arbitrators knew of the mandatory provision in the
ADEA with respect to the payment of attorneys' fees, nor was
there any proof that the arbitrators intentionally disregarded the
provision. The court noted that "mere ignorance of the applica-
ble law is not basis for change.
20 6
Such a ruling seems to belie Judge Harry T. Edwards' earlier
pronouncement in Cole v. Burns International Security Service207
that he was not concerned about the unconscionability or unen-
forceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. His rea-
son for such assuredness was that the "courts will always remain
available to ensure that arbitrators properly interpret the dictates
202. See Cooper, supra note 195, at 214.
203. Id. at 216 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953)); see
also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(5) (1994).
204. One commentator has noted that "[the same industry experience
and expertise that makes a private arbitrator attractive as an alternative to a
judge .. .may render the arbitrator in a discrimination case subject to the very
biases that the ... plaintiff is seeking to remedy." G. Richard Shell, ERISA and
Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an 'Adequate
Substitute'for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REv. 509, 569 (1990).
205. 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
206. Id.
207. 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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of public law."208 The Cole court leads one to wonder whether a
dependence on the courts' ability to preserve the sanctity of the
civil rights laws is misplaced if in fact an arbitrator's knowledge of
the law to be interpreted is not a prerequisite to the use of
mandatory binding arbitration.
4. Social Vindication
Finally, there is a question as to whether mandatory arbitra-
tion of civil rights claims should be allowed because the arbitra-
tion proceeding is relatively private and thus does not result in
social vindication. When Congress enacts civil rights legislation,
Congress intends to address a wrong committed against society as
well as the individual or class of individuals. By contrast, arbitra-
tion is a private process. In fact, while plaintiffs are not always
against resolving certain disputes in privacy and confidential-
ity,2 °9 this feature is one of the main attractions for employers,
especially those who depend heavily on good will to survive in a
competitive market. The results of an arbitrator's decision are
private and touch only the immediate parties to the litigation.
Because the decision is private, individuals who are not party to
the litigation rarely learn of the wrong that has been committed.
Thus, because the general public may be unaware that company
X has been involved in discriminatory practices, public pressure
cannot be brought against company X to change its practices.
Additionally, because a written opinion is not necessarily issued,
the potential for the law to change and evolve with the times is
impaired.
There is also a question about an arbitrator's ability to
implement programs that are designed to remedy the past effects
of discrimination. An arbitrator's role is limited to resolving the
dispute between the parties to the litigation, but sometimes this
is not enough. All one has to do is reflect back on the school
desegregation cases to see what an important role the courts
have played in attempting to rectify past wrongs. An arbitrator
would not be able to issue such broad injunctive relief. As com-
mentator Shell has noted, commercial arbitration focuses on spe-
cific transactions and not on institutional goals.2"0 The Court in
Gilmer stated that society's interest can still be vindicated because
208. Id.
209. Not all employees are interested in a public airing of their problems
with their employer. Some might even be embarrassed for it to become public
knowledge that they have allowed themselves to be treated a certain way for so
long. Also, certain claims, such as racial or sexual harassment, might be more
easily pursued in the privacy of an arbitration proceeding.
210. See Shell, supra note 204, at 572.
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the employee could file a claim with the EEOC. 211 However, it
should be noted that the EEOC is not compelled to bring suit.
In addition, Professor Cooper has noted that a realistic examina-
tion of the EEOC's capabilities shows that the EEOC does not
have the proper resources to be the sole stalwart of societal vindi-
212cation. 2 Therefore, the use of mandatory arbitration agree-
ments can conceivably result in the wholesale bypassing of one of
the most effective solutions to societal discrimination, the judi-
cially crafted resolution.
IV. THE POST- GzLMER CASES
Since the Gilmer decision, there have been a number of
related issues which the lower courts have had to address. These
issues cover a range of areas, including civil rights and the con-
tractual obligations that arise from an employee handbook. The
courts are often split on the application and interpretation of
Gilmer with regard to the above issues and many others.
A. Knowing Waiver of Rights
The first of the major issues that the courts have had to
address is whether an employee must knowingly waive rights to
bring a claim in a court. The Ninth Circuit, in Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Lai,2 held that an employee cannot be
forced to arbitrate Title VII claims unless he or she has knowingly
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration.214 Even if the
employee is aware of the arbitration provision, the employee can
still be without notice that he or she is agreeing to arbitrate any
Title VII claims if the provision did not describe what specific
types of suits were to be arbitrated and if there was insufficient
time to review the agreements. 21 5 The court relied on Senator
211. SeeGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
212. See Cooper, supra note 195, at 219-20 (noting that the limited
financial and political capability of the EEOC impacts its ability to protect
society's interest and thus judicial vindication is warranted for civil rights
statutes).
213. 42 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995); see also
Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper, 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that just as there is a knowing requirement for Title VII claims, there is a
knowing requirement for claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Pierce v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that ADEA rights could only be relinquished through a
knowing and voluntary waiver and that the employer has the burden of proving
the employee's waiver was knowing and voluntary).
214. See id. at 130; see also Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
215. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 130.
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Robert Dole's floor comments on Title VII that the employee
could only be held to arbitration when the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods.216
However, other courts have held that Title VII does not have
a "knowing waiver" requirement as long as employees sign an
agreement to arbitrate their statutory rights.217 In Beauchamp v.
Great West Life Assurance Co.,2l8 the court rejected the reasoning
in Prudential, stating that:
[t]he portions of the [Title VII] legislative history relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit [were] slender reeds upon
which to rest the weighty and novel conclusion that an
arbitration clause is only binding when the claimant has
actual knowledge that his particular employment discrimi-
nation claims will be covered by the agreement.
219
B. Substantive Rights
The second major issue which the lower courts have had to
address is the nature of the employer's ability to affect an
employee's substantive rights in an arbitration agreement. In
responding to this issue, the courts appear to place strict limita-
tions on the employer's ability to force an employee to agree to
waive statutory substantive rights. For example, in Graham Oil Co.
v. ARCO Products Co.,22° the court refused to compel arbitration
when the arbitration agreement "purport[ed] to forfeit certain
important statutorily-mandated rights or benefits. ' 22 1 The arbi-
tration clause in this case eliminated the right to recover punitive
damages and attorney fees, and it reduced the statute of limita-
tions from one year to 90 days. 222 Further, in Stirlen v.
Supercut, 223 the court held that arbitration clauses that "provide
the employer more rights and greater remedies than would
otherwise be available and concomitantly deprive employees of
216. See id.
217. See Brookwood v. Bank of Am., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). The Brookwood court held that the only reason for a court to find an
arbitration agreement unenforceable is if there is a unilateral mistake by the
contracting party. See id. at 519. The court did not agree with the Prudential
court's holding that a lack of knowing regarding waiver is also reason to find
the agreement unenforceable. Further, the Brookwood court held that the court
in Prudential ignored the expressed endorsement of arbitration in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See id.
218. 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
219. Id. at 1096.
220. 43 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995).
221. Id. at 1246.
222. See id. at 1248.
223. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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significant rights and remedies that they would normally enjoy"
are unenforceable. 24 In addition, the Stirlen court held that the
clause was unenforceable because of an "imbalance in bargain-
ing power."225 However, this aspect of Stirlen is inconsistent with
Gilmer, which stated that " [m] ere inequality in bargaining power,
however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agree-
ments are never enforceable in the employment context."226
This notable inconsistency which addresses substantive rights is
more palatable than the Gilmer view which ignores the basic
structure of the employment relationship, especially at the appli-
cation stage.
C. Employee Handbooks
The third major issue the courts have addressed revolves
around the enforceability of arbitration clauses found in
employee handbooks.227 In Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, InC.2 28
the employee had received and signed an employee handbook
which contained an arbitration clause that was separated from
the other sections of the handbook.229 The court agreed that
employee handbooks are not generally considered to be binding
contracts between the employee and the employer, but noted an
exception in this case. The court based its determination upon
the way in which the arbitration clause was presented in the
handbook.230 The court found that the language of the clause
(which included phrases such as "I understand," "I accept," and
"I agree"), combined with the division between the main sections
of the handbook and the arbitration clause, made it contractual
in nature and thus enforceable. 231
Taking a somewhat different tack, the court in Heurtebise v.
Reliable Business Computers, Inc.,23 2 agreed that, in general, an
224. Id. at 151.
225. Id. at 146.
226. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S 20, 33 (1991).
227. See, e.g., Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243
(Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1311 (1997); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
228. 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
229. See id. at 835.
230. See id.
231. See id. In addition to the employee handbook issue, the court also
noted that it was because of Gilmer, that the statutory claims of this employee
were subject to arbitration agreements. See id. at 837.
232. 550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996). The plaintiff's claim in this case was
based on gender discrimination. She claimed that both she and a male co-
worker took a lunch in excess of the allowable time, but that only she received
adverse employment action as a result.
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employee handbook is not a contract between the employee and
the employer.2"3 The court noted that in this case, moreover,
the employer had reserved the right to modify the employee
handbook at any time during the duration of employment and
that this rendered the arbitration clause contained in the
employee handbook unenforceable. 234 In order to ensure that
an arbitration clause contained in an employee handbook is
enforceable an employer would thus be well-advised to follow the
courts' lessons in these cases and separate the arbitration agree-
ment from the employee handbook to ensure its contractual
nature.
D. Civil Rights Act of 1964
The fourth major issue that the courts have addressed since
the Gilmer decision involves the ability of employees and employ-
ers to agree to arbitrate any disputes that involve a violation of
the employees' civil rights. Despite the volatility of the issues
involved in these cases, the courts have been fairly consistent in
their rulings that an employee can agree to arbitrate his or her
civil rights claims.235
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,23 6 for exam-
ple, the court held that arbitration agreements that specifically
state that the employees' gender and disability discrimination
claims are subject to arbitration are enforceable. 237 This ability
to arbitrate these claims was viewed in the context of congres-
sional intentions to support arbitration and weighed against the
policies surrounding civil rights claims. The court in Austin
found that "the language of the statutes [Title VII and ADA]
could not be more clear in showing congressional favor towards
arbitration. "'28 This congressional favor to which Austin refers is
also spoken of as the "national policy favoring arbitration."239
This policy goes past the "at-will" nature of the employment and
233. See id. at 246.
234. See id. The specific text to which the court refers is "the company
specifically reserves the right, and may make modifications to any or all of the
Policies herein, at its sole discretion, and as future conditions may warrant." Id.
at 247.
235. See Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.
1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgt. Co., 921 P.2d 146 (Haw. 1996).
236. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
237. See id. at 879 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
238. Id. at 881.
239. Great Western, 110 F.3d at 230 (3rd Cir. 1997) (quoting Southland v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997).
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allows an arbitration agreement to be enforced as a contract
despite the ability of the employee to leave at any time and for
any reason.24 °
This notion is observed and followed in other sex discrimi-
nation cases as well. 241 Recently, the D.C. Circuit took issue with
the enforceability of conditions of employment requiring individ-
uals to arbitrate claims resting on statutory rights, while making a
distinction between mandatory arbitration in and outside the
context of the union collective bargaining. 24 2 The court noted
the legitimacy concerns that surround agreements outside the
collective bargaining context.243 One of the concerns the court
had was that as in this case, mandatory arbitration agreements
are often presented to the employee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
and there is a lack of union negotiation for such a term.2 4 4 In
addition, arbitrators may not have the competence to decide
purely legal issues relating to statutory rights.2 45 But, the court
found that the Supreme Court has made it clear that statutory
claims are fully subject to binding arbitration.246
E. Miscellaneous
In addition to the aforesaid issues, the courts have had to
wrestle with numerous other issues, covering a wide range of situ-
ations. 247 As with the major issues discussed above, the courts
have also been divided in how to treat these situations. One of
the reasons the courts are not in total agreement in the applica-
240. See Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgt. Co., 921 P.2d 146, 149 (Haw. 1996)
(holding that mandatory arbitration claims under state anti-discrimination
statutes were enforceable even though the employee's status was that of "at-
will").
241. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The plaintiff claimed that the arbitration of this matter would be in violation of
public policy because the statute of limitations was limited by the arbitration
clause to one year, down from the statutorily based two years In addition, the
plaintiff claimed that the employer had waived its rights to an arbitration of
these issues, to which the court answered that the resolution of that issue must
be decided by the arbitrator.
242. See id. at 1473-79.
243. See id. at 1475.
244. See id. at 1477.
245. See id.
246. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
247. SeeJay W. Waks, Predispute ADR Raises Fairness Issue: Courts Have Not
Hesitated to Enforce Arbitration Agreements Except When the Fairness of the Process is
Compromised, 19 NAT'L. L.J. B8 (1997) ("The most troubling challenges to
arbitration policies have focused on fairness of the process, not whether a
judicial forum is the exclusive one."). Id.
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tion of Gilmer is because of the lack of guidance provided by the
Gilmer Court as to its application.
One such issue is the neutrality of the "arbitrator".248 In
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Ass'n,2 49 the court held that
an employer could not force a plaintiff/employee to bring a
wrongful discharge claim before the employer's review board
pursuant to an ADR program. 250 The court held that this was
not "arbitration" because of the lack of impartiality of the
board.25 1
In analyzing other issues, the courts often rely on public pol-
icy to decide how Gilmer should be applied.252 In Cole v. Burns
International Security Services,253 for example, the court noted the
legitimacy concerns that surround the agreements outside the
collective bargaining arena. 254 One of the concerns the court
had was that as in this case, mandatory arbitration agreements
are often presented to the employee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
and there is a lack of union negotiation for such a term.255 In
addition, arbitrators may not have the competence to decide
purely legal issues relating to statutory rights.256
V. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INITIATIVES IN THE AFTERMATH OF
In the aftermath of Gilmer there have been a number of pro-
fessional organizations and bar associations which have
attempted to address the fairness and due process issues arising
from mandatory arbitration of statutory employment disputes.
Initiatives have been advanced by the ABA, AAA, SPIDR, Jams/
248. See Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Ass'n., 50 Cal. App. 4th
676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
249. Id.
250. See id. at 692-93.
251. See id. at 693.
252. See, e.g., Thomas James Ass'n v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60 (2nd Cir.
1996); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
253. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
254. See id. at 1475. The court took issue with the enforceability of
conditions of employment requiring individuals to arbitrate claims resting on
statutory rights, while making a distinction between mandatory arbitration in
and outside the context of the union collective bargaining. See id. at 1473-79.
255. See id. at 1477. The court also decided that employees cannot be
required to pay the costs of the arbitrator when the employment is conditioned
on the acceptance of the arbitration agreement. See id. at 1483. The court held
that requiring the employee to pay for such expenses would be likely to prevent
him from pursuing his statutory claims. See id. at 1484. Further, the court held
that such expenses should be borne solely by the employer. See id. at 1485.
256. See id. at 1485.
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EnDispute, CPR2"7 and U.S. Arbitration and Mediation (U.S. A.
& M.). These professional organizations have been in the fore-
front of efforts to wade through the morass of public policy con-
cerns surrounding mandated arbitration. They are to be
commended for their efforts to step in where there is obviously a
void to be filled in attempting to assist in the assurance that due
process is observed in this critical area. This article focuses upon
the protocol that was spearheaded by the ABA and that has
achieved the most prominence. In developing the document,
the ABA sought to achieve the consensus of a diverse group of
labor and employment entities that represent disputants or pro-
vide administrative services, service providers, and neutrals.
A. The ADR Protocol
On May 9, 1995, the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution in Employment of the ABA Section on Labor and Employ-
ment Law issued the results of its examination of "questions of
due process arising out of the use of mediation and arbitration
for resolving employment disputes. '"258 The document, entitled
"A Due Process Protocol for Mediation, ' '259 is to be used as "a
means of providing due process in the resolution by mediation
and binding arbitration of employment disputes of statutory
rights."26 The ADR Protocol was endorsed by the National
Academy of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association, Soci-
ety of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, National Employment
Lawyers Association, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
and the American Civil Liberties Union.261
257. For another example of a protocol which covers substantially the
same topics as the ADR Protocol, see CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAM FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYERS (1995).
258. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, 91 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-11, E-11
(May 11, 1995) [hereinafter ADR Protocol].
259. Throughout the protocol the Task Force makes reference to
mediation as well as arbitration. This article does not cover the comments
about mediation because the focus of this discussion is on arbitration.
260. ADR Protocol, supra note 258, at E- 11.
261. The following organizations designated representatives to
participate in the development of the protocol. The statements, however, do
not reflect or represent the policy of the designating organizations, but rather
the personal views of the individuals: Council of Labor and Employment
Section, ABA; National Academy of Arbitrators, Arbitration Committee of
Labor and Employment Section, ABA (three representatives); American
Arbitration Association (two representatives); Federal Mediation and
Conciliation; Workplace Rights Project; American Civil Liberties Union; Society
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution; and National Employment Lawyers
Association. See id.
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The ADR Protocol is divided into four sections and is con-
fined to the examination of questions regarding "due process
arising out of the use of ... arbitration for resolving employment
disputes" '262 of a statutory nature. The stated focus of the proto-
col is on "standards of exemplary due process."263 The repre-
sentatives could not reach a consensus on the "difficult issue" of
the "timing of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute." '264 There-
fore, the protocol does not take a position on whether agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory disputes should be entered into
before the dispute arises or after the dispute arises (hereinafter
pre- or post-dispute).265 The only consensus that was reached
was that the agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims should be "knowingly made. 2 66
Regarding the right of representation, the protocol suggests
that employees "should have the right to be represented by a
spokesperson of their own choosing."26 7 It suggests that the arbi-
tration procedure specify this right and that it "should include
reference to institutions which might offer assistance, by listing
bar associations, legal service associations, civil rights organiza-
tions, trade unions, etc. "268 It leaves up to the parties the task of
determining between themselves "the amount and method of
payment for representation '269 and recommends "a number of
existing systems which provide employer reimbursement of at
262. Id. at E-11.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. The Task Force goes on to express the competing opinions of each
of several contingents of representatives. The first contingent felt that the
agreements to arbitrate should be "informed, voluntary and not a condition of
initial or continued employment." The second contingent felt that employers
have the right to insist on agreements to "arbitrate statutory disputes as a
condition of initial or continued employment." The reasoning for the latter
contingent's opposition to postponing the agreement until after the dispute
arises is that there is a "stronger predisposition to litigate" resulting in "very
few" agreements to arbitrate and therefore less likelihood of using alternative
dispute resolution. This they declare will not result in helping to give relief to
the overburdened administrative and judicial systems. The third contingent
had determined that employees should not be forced to make the decision as to
whether they want to arbitrate their individual cases until after the dispute
arises. The fourth and final contingent did not believe that employees should
be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief for any reason. See id. at E-11.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at E-11 (Section B. 1., "Right of Representation").
269. Id. at E-11 (Section B.2., "Fees for Representation"). The protocol
suggests that the arbitrator have "the authority to provide for partial or full
reimbursement of fees" as part of the remedy or "in accordance with applicable
law or in the interests ofjustice." Id.
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least a portion of an employee's attorney fees, especially for
lower paid employees. "270
The ADR Protocol notes that one of the advantages of arbi-
tration is usually the savings of time and money spent in pre-trial
discovery. It encourages "adequate but limited discovery" and
suggests that the employees "have access to all information rea-
sonably relevant" to their claims. 271 It also provides for "pre-
hearing depositions consistent with the nature of arbitration. "272
The protocol calls for arbitrators to have skill in the conduct
of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at stake in the dis-
pute, and familiarity with the workplace and employment envi-
ronment. '273 The Task Force suggests that a "roster of available
arbitrators be established on a non-discriminatory basis, diverse
by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, and other charac-
teristics to satisfy the parties that their interest and objectives will
be respected and fully considered., 274 It urges arbitrators to
"reject cases if they believe that the procedure lacks requisite due
process.
27 5
With respect to training of the arbitrators, the protocol sug-
gests the creation of a roster of arbitrators by the development of
a training program "to educate existing and potential labor and
employment arbitrators as to the statutes, including substantive,
procedural and remedial issues to be confronted .... 276 This
training is to be required for all arbitrators, conducted nation-
ally, and provided by "the government agencies, bar associations,
270. Id.
271. Id. (Section B.3., "Access to Information").
272. Id. (Section B.3., "Access to Information").
273. Id. (Section C.I., "Mediator and Arbitrator Qualification, Roster
Membership"). On one hand, the protocol recognizes that "the existing cadre
of labor and employment arbitrators, some lawyers, some not .... is unlikely,
without special training, to consistently possess knowledge of the statutory
environment" and the "nonunion environment." Id. On the other hand, the
protocol recognizes the need for "arbitrators with expertise in statutory
requirements in the employment field who may, without special training, lack
experience in the employment area and in the conduct of arbitration
hearings." Id. at E-11-12.
274. Id. at E-11. The protocol also recognizes the right of parties to
jointly select an arbitrator at their discretion who does not possess the above
qualities because they have the requisite trust in that individual as most
promising to bring finality to the dispute and to "withstand judicial scrutiny."
See id.
275. Id. at E-12.
276. Id. (Section C.2., "Training"). The protocol also suggests "the
training of experts in the statutes as to the employer procedures governing the
employment relationship as well a due process and fairness in the conduct and
control of arbitration hearings." Id.
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academic institutions, etc., administered perhaps by the designat-
ing agency, such as the AAA." As an alternative, training could
be provided by a mentoring program.277
Regarding selection of the arbitrators, the protocol suggests
a list procedure such as the one used by the AAA, by which par-
ties strike unacceptable arbitrators, and it suggests that the par-
ties empower the "designating agency to appoint a mediator
and/or arbitrator if the striking procedure is unacceptable or
unsuccessful. ' 278 The protocol imposes on the arbitrator "a duty
to disclose any relationship which might reasonably constitute or
be perceived as a conflict of interest."279 It suggests that the arbi-
trator be "required to sign an oath affirming the absence of such
present or preexisting ties."280 It further suggests that the arbi-
trator "be bound by applicable agreements, statutes, regulations
and rules of procedure of the designating agency ... "281
With respect to the arbitrator's authority, the ADR Protocol
states that the arbitrator should be empowered to "permit rea-
sonable discovery, issue subpoenas, decide arbitrability, etc.," as
well as to "award whatever relief would be available in court
under the law."28 2 The protocol notes that "impartiality is best
assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the arbi-
trator," but suggests that where economic conditions do not per-
mit the equal sharing of fees, the parties should mutually agree
on arrangements. 28 3
Finally, the ADR Protocol suggests that the arbitrator's
award be final and binding and the scope of review limited.284
277. See id.
278. Id. (Section C. 3., "Panel"). In addition, the protocol suggests that
the parties receive the names of the parties and their representatives in recent
cases decided by the arbitrators to help make the selection. See id.
279. Id. (Section C.4., "Conflicts of Interest")
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (Section C.5., "Authority of the Arbitrator"). Further, the
protocol states that the arbitrator should issue an award consisting of, inter alia,
a statement of any other issues resolved and a statement regarding the
disposition of any statutory claim(s). See id.
283. Id. (Section C.6., "Compensation of the Arbitrator"). Otherwise, the
suggestion is that the arbitrator "determine allocation of fees." It is also
suggested that to "reduce the bias potential of disparate contributions," the
designating agency may forward payment to the arbitrator "without disclosing
the parties' share therein." Id.
284. See id. (Section D., "Scope of Review").
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B. Response to the ADR Protocol
1. Inclusivity
Notwithstanding these laudable efforts, a glaringly apparent
problem exists in the development of the ADR Protocols. There
was an obvious lack of participation of representatives from many
of the very classes of individuals the civil rights statutes were
erected to protect.2 85 Just as it was found to be unlawful to deny
the right of full participation in the efforts of members of pro-
tected classes to earn a living, it is inappropriate to fail to appre-
ciate the tragic impact of the de facto exclusion or denial of
participation of trained and qualified racial and ethnic minori-
ties, women, and disabled voices in the development of the pro-
tocols. This group of individuals are some of the major
stakeholders in the process. This observation is based on the fact
that certain components are missing from the protocols that
should be present.286
2. Economic Considerations
There are several significant areas that also demand more
sensitive development in light of the fact that many of the claim-
285. The observation regarding the demographic make-up of the drafters
of the protocols and other problems mentioned below were first discussed in an
unpublished advisory memorandum collectively prepared by the author and
other Subcommittee members of the Law and Public Policy Committee of
SPIDR. The purpose of the advisory memorandum was to attempt to influence
needed changes in the then-proposed draft of the ADR Protocol. The
comments herein are meant to reflect my personal comments, which may or
may not mirror the comments of the subcommittee in its official capacity.
As far as the author understands, of the twelve representatives who
participated in the development of the ADR Protocol, none were members of a
racial or ethnic minority or disabled. Nor were there any participants whose
main purpose was to represent the interests of these groups. Only one was a
woman, and there was no indication from the information provided that she
represented a group dedicated to women's issues. There were also no
representatives of employees in lower socio-economic groups or of the aging
workforce, specifically.
286. By urging that demographic stakeholders should have been
included in the actual development of the protocol, the author does not
suggest that the Task Force members were incapable of or did not intend to
develop a protocol which seeks to be fair and regular in addressing the rights
and interests of various affected individuals. However, from both a process and
politically pragmatic perspective, it is important to include representatives of
the major demographic stakeholders in the development of any ADR public
policy. Such inclusion would have afforded the drafters of the ADR Protocol a
different perspective, one which may have ultimately led to the recognition and
incorporation of various elements and conditions that address particular needs,
concerns, and interests.
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ant-disputants are also members of disadvantaged socio-eco-
nomic groups. They may not be able to afford either the cost of
the arbitration, including the arbitrator's fee, or the services of
an attorney or other competent representative. These are reali-
ties which create a serious dilemma. Many claimants who can
least afford to be unemployed will be the most anxious dispu-
tants to have their claims resolved in the fastest and least costly
fashion. These realities have the potential of effectively forcing
such claimants to avoid what for them may be the costly proce-
dure of arbitration. These claimants may agree to settlements
out of desperation rather than enjoying the full benefits that
arbitration provides, regardless of the due process concerns.
The public policy implication of such realities poses the question
of whether the primary function of mandatory arbitration is actu-
ally to act as a vehicle or mechanism to "close-out" cases under
the name of administrative and judicial convenience.
3. Timing
Another significant public policy issue on which the Task
Force failed to make a hard but necessary decision concerns the
mandated or "imposed" use of arbitration as a pre-dispute condi-
tion of employment. The plaintiff's bar, under the auspices of
the National Employment Lawyers' Association (NELA), has
taken a strong position on this very heated issue and has even
staged a boycott to demonstrate its importance.8 7 Since the
ADR Protocol will be used as a guide by employers and ADR neu-
trals, the failure to directly address this issue head-on is a serious
flaw. While sharing the thoughts of the various representatives
on the Task Force was helpful to show that there is strong disa-
greement, it provides very little, if any, guidance. If the ADR Pro-
tocol is to serve its purpose as "a means of providing due process
in the resolution by . .. binding arbitration of employment dis-
putes involving statutory rights," then there is no place for "waf-
fling" on such an issue. Perhaps now that NELA and others have
taken a position on this and other issues,2"' the Task Force can
be reconvened and expanded to include some stakeholders, and
more defined, informed and expanded positions can be devel-
oped and announced. Representatives from some suggested
organizations include the NAACP, Urban League, Mexican
287. See, e.g., Plaintiff Lawyer's Group Declares War on ADR Industry,
ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. ALERT, Dec. 1995, at 3.
288. See infra text accompanying notes 303-11 for a discussion about the
various private and governmental organizations that have taken a position
against certain aspects of mandated arbitration in recent years.
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American Legal Defense Fund, NOW, Women's Legal Defense
Fund, AARP, and disability advocacy organizations, such as the
National Disability Action Center.
4. Unrepresented Claimants
One critical element of concern is the need for employees to
have representation by counsel or a competent layperson. 28 9 A
problem attendant thereto is the difficulty of securing counsel
for employment discrimination claimants. 29 0 Employees may not
have the necessary resources to afford to pay attorneys' fees, par-
ticularly in the case of termination. 291 There is a general recog-
nition which has been growing in recent years that claimants who
are not represented do not fare well in the arbitration process.292
Richard Delgado and others have concluded through reviewing
social-psychological theories and studies, that people have a ten-
dency to act out their prejudices in informal settings such as
those posed by some ADR processes.29 3 No doubt, despite the
more formalized procedure of arbitration, represented employ-
ees would be less vulnerable in an arbitration setting than those
who are unrepresented.
A significant question emerges as to whether ethically, ADR
providers, ADR neutrals, and EEO enforcement agencies should
encourage or rather discourage unrepresented claimants' sub-
mission of their public policy related disputes to such formalized
289. In the author's experience in working in the area of employment
discrimination law, as a representative for both plaintiffs and defendants, as an
Administrative Judge for the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, as a
director of human resources, and as a mediator and arbitrator, it has been
observed that trained laypersons, while perhaps not generally knowledgeable
about proceedings in court, can be competent in the representation of
claimants before administrative agencies, and in arbitration and mediation.
290. University of Michigan Professor Theodore St. Antoine, estimates
that experienced lawyers agree to handle "only about one out of every 100
potential discrimination cases." Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mandatory
Arbitration Better for Workers with EEOC, Courts Stretched, Professor Says, 151 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-2 (Aug. 6, 1997). He reasons that "many cases aren't worth
their time to litigate." Id.
291. See id.
292. See Lewis Maltby, Paradise-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
1 (1994); see also Michael P. Maslanka, The Ultimate Objective: Mandatory
Arbitration of All Non-Union Employment Disputes, Audio tape of Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 22nd Annual Conference, Dallas, TX
(October 26-29, 1994).
293. See Richard Delgado et. al., Minimizing Prejudice Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rrv.
1359.
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adjudicatory processes as arbitration.294 An even more funda-
mental question remains as to whether ADR processes can ever
be designed to meet one of the underlying objectives of the stat-
utes, i.e., to prohibit discrimination. 295
Employers stand to receive a great benefit in time, money,
and control over the process in devising ADR programs such as
pre- as well as post-dispute mandatory arbitration. Some of those
savings should be passed on to the employee.296 The Task Force
has fashioned a novel and inventive approach to assure claimants
a greater possibility of representation in arbitration. However,
the author suggests that the employer go even further. In today's
economy many social service organizations are severely
underfunded and are unable to offer any assistance to employees
who are in need of competent representation. The author sug-
gests that the employers seriously consider covering all or part of
the costs related to attorney fees by developing initiatives such as
294. See Lamont Stallworth, Ruminations About Professional Responsibilities
and Ethics for the EEO Neutral and ADR Providers: The Unrepresented Claimant, Power
Imbalance and Designing Programs (a paper presented at the Employment
Conclave sponsored by the American Arbitration Association, September 1995,
Washington, D.C.)
295. In their testimony submitted to the Commission on the Future of
Management-Worker Relations, a conglomeration of women's groups stated
that the "prevention of complaints through the removal of the cause of
complaints should be the first priority of the Commission in addressing dispute
resolution." Testimony of American Nurses Association, Black Women United
for Action, Business and Professional Women/USA, Center for Advancement of
Public Policy, Center for Women Policy Studies, Church Women United,
Clearinghouse on Women's Issues, Coalition of Labor Union Women, Fund for
the Feminist Majority, Mana, A National Latina Organization, National Center
for the Early Childhood Workforce, National Committee on Pay Equity, Older
Women's League, Wider Opportunities for Women, Women Employed
Institute, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Women Work!, and YWCA submitted
to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Presented
by Martha Burk, Ph.D., President, Center for Advancement of Public Policy,
September 29, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Testimony of Women's Groups].
296. Part of the impetus for the implementation at Brown & Root in 1992
of an ADR program, in which the employer pays a majority of the employee's
expenses for dispute resolution, was a $400,000 legal fee paid to outside counsel
for successfully defending itself in a single discrimination suit. The employer's
Associate General Counsel for Human Resources' assessment was that it was a
case that "nobody won." Three years after the ADR program began, the
employer spent "less than half of what it used to spend on legal fees for
employment-related cases" and legal fees alone were reduced by about 90
percent. See Alternative Dispute Resolution-Employers Experiences With ADR in the
Workplace, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil Service, Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 3940 (1997).
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the much touted program utilized by Brown & Root,2 97 which
pays for each employee to secure representation in mediation or
arbitration.298 Obviously, Brown & Root is a leader in this
respect. However, other companies should follow this lead if
they want to receive the full benefit of ADR. One of the features
of the Brown & Root Dispute Resolution Program includes the
payment by employees of a $50.00 processing fee to take his/her
case to external mediation or arbitration and an additional
$25.00 deductible for each dispute as required. This is part a of a
unique "Legal Consultation Plan" that pays 90 percent of an
employee's attorney fees, up to a maximum benefit of $2,500
annually.299 The relatively small payment by employees is an
important part of the program because there is a school of
thought that it is more likely and may be even more effective in
some environments if the claimants pay some amount. This
helps the claimants have some economic stake in the process and
feel some sense of control over the process.
The payment of the arbitrator's fees and any other adminis-
trative costs should be borne by the employer. Again, employers
receive significant financial benefit from the use of mandatory
arbitration. At least one court has found that it was only fair that
the employer pay the costs of the arbitrator.30 ° A "blind" fee
arrangement similar to the one suggested by the ADR Protocol,
where fees are paid through a neutral agency so that the arbitra-
tor does not know which party is paying all or what percentage of
the fee, is also a good idea.
5. Publication of Arbitration Awards
The suggestion that the parties receive the names of the par-
ties and their representatives in the arbitrators' most recent cases
may provide valuable information regarding the arbitrators' tem-
perament and demeanor, but it ignores one of the main tenets of
arbitration-privacy for the parties involved. This means privacy
not only with respect to the substantive nature of the claim and
the decision of the arbitrator, but privacy with respect to the
297. In the GAO Report, with respect the use of ADR in the federal and
private sectors, the agency revealed its conclusions on the study of (1) six
private companies: Brown & Root, Hughes Electronics Corp., Polaroid,
Rockwell International Corp., and TRW, and (2) five federal agencies: the
Departments of Agriculture and State, the Postal Service, the Air Force, and
Walter Reed Army Medical Center. See id.
298. See id. at 38.
299. See id.
300. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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mere existence of a claim. What the parties and their representa-
tives need is to have access to the arbitrators' written decisions.
Therefore, the arbitral awards should be made public. Where
possible, they should be published by such reporting services as
the Bureau of National Affairs and Commerce Clearing House.
The use of arbitration in these disputes is akin to the federal dis-
trict court systems, whose decisions are public documents. A
contractual agreement to arbitrate statutory rights should not
convert those individual statutory rights to private contractual
rights.
There are a number of benefits to be derived from publica-
tion of arbitral awards. These include but are not limited to (1)
creating a body of arbitral cases which may be reviewed and eval-
uated in light of the statutory case law developed under the pub-
lic justice system; (2) developing a body of arbitral awards which
can be reviewed to ascertain and evaluate the decision-making
process of private arbitrators, which would be helpful in the
future selection of arbitrators; and (3) removing the concern
that the private arbitration process may be used to hide the inci-
dence and frequency of discrimination in the workplace.
6. Right to Discovery
Since ordinarily the employer controls most of the relevant
information for a dispute, it is critical that an employee's right to
discovery, which would be guaranteed in court, is observed in
mandated arbitration. While the extensive discovery allowed in
court may not be necessary in arbitration, the ADR Protocol's
assessment of what discovery is necessary, i.e., "access to all infor-
mation reasonably relevant to ... arbitration," is appropriate. It
should be noted, however, that federal rules generally allow dis-
covery of information that might "lead to" relevant information.
This causes one to wonder how much employees giving up
under this newly developed standard.
7. Arbitrator Qualifications
The ADR Protocol has captured the essence of the skills, train-
ing, background and experience necessary for arbitrators to com-
petently decide these statutory issues. One concern is the
designation of the diversity of individuals who should be
included as arbitrators in terms of "gender, ethnicity, back-
ground, experience, etc." One designation conspicuously absent
from the list is that of "racial minorities." If the designation of
ethnicity was assumed to include racial minorities, that assump-
tion is incorrect and does not take into consideration the reali-
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ties of the American culture and its demographical makeup.
Ethnic minorities and racial minorities are two distinct catego-
ries.3 °1 In a General Accounting Office Report, the conclusions
were that the "vast majority of securities arbitrators were white
men over the age of 60.'02 If the arbitration panels are to
become more diverse, then certainly race must be a serious
consideration.
VI. THE POST- GILMFJR BACKLASH
As mentioned earlier, the EEOC has taken a stand squarely
against mandatory arbitration of statutory claims when the agree-
ment to arbitrate is entered into prior to the dispute and when
the right to pursue the claim at the EEOC and in the courts is
considered waived at the outset. Several significant players in the
field have followed by announcing their positions on the subject
as a group and individually.
In the fall of 1995, the National Employment Lawyers Associ-
ation (NELA), an organization which primarily represents plain-
tiff/employees in employment cases, announced its boycott
against ADR providers, namely arbitrators who service employers
and employees who have entered into agreements that result in
mandatory arbitration. The announcement of NELA's boycott
had a swift response from two of the largest ADR service provid-
ers, AAA and JAMS/EnDispute, who rejected the boycott as an
inappropriate measure in light of the ruling in Gilmer. Although
this plan fizzled for lack of support among its over 2000 mem-
bers, it initiated discussion among the various groups in the
employment area who had previously been fairly silent on the
issue.
The National Academy of Arbitrators (Academy), "one of
the nation's most respected groups of ADR providers"3 ° has
recently entered the fray and "raised the stakes in the battle over
mandatory arbitration"304 by announcing its opposition to
mandatory arbitration under certain circumstances. In its "State-
301. For a discussion of the multiple characteristics on which
discrimination can be based, see Leona Green, Mixed Motives and After-Acquired
Evidence: Second Cousins Benefit From 20/20 Hindsight, 49 ARK L. REV. 211, 220
n.22 (1996).
302. See GAO Report, supra note 296, at 99.
303. See Rinat Fried, ADR Group Condemns Mandatory Employment
Arbitration, AM. LAw. MEDIA, L.P. , THE RECORDER, June 3, 1997, at 1.
304. In reflecting upon how the Academy came to decide to take a
position in the ever-controversial area of mandatory arbitration, the immediate
past president of the organization, George Nicolau stated, "We were concerned
about it because the field was growing, and we knew that a lot of employment
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ment of the National Academy of Arbitrators on Condition of
Employment Agreements," the Academy took a strong stand
against its members' participation as arbitrators in certain types
of cases by declaring, "The National Academy of Arbitrators
opposes mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of
employment when it requires waiver of direct access to either a
judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory
rights." The Academy urges its members to "consider and evalu-
ate the fairness of any employment arbitration procedures in
light of the Academy's 'Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory
Claims Under Employer-Promulgated Systems."' These guide-
lines, which are to be followed in addition to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor Management Disputes, °5
provide the Academy members with some "practical, procedural
and evidentiary questions of application that the arbitrator might
encounter in deciding whether to hear these cases and, if so, how
they might be resolved."3 °6 The guidelines go as far as noting to
the Academy members that they should be aware that the power
to "withdraw from a case in the face of policies, rules, or proce-
dures that are manifestly unfair or contrary to fundamental due
process carries considerable moral suasion." ''"7
The Academy refers its members to the ADR Protocol 30 if
the agreements under which the arbitration arises present ques-
tions of due process. This action on the part of an organization
like the Academy, which has every economic interest in keeping
these disputes out of court and in their forum, is yet another
strong signal that there is something fundamentally unfair with
the present system granted by Gilmer. This system, which allows
employers to dictate to employees how they will go about achiev-
ing satisfaction for the employer's alleged wrongdoing when
there are statutory procedures to the contrary, must be changed.
An even more surprising announcement from within the
industry which has perhaps enjoyed the fruits of the Gilmer deci-
sion more than any other is that of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) on August 7, 1997. The Board of Gov-
ernors of the NASD voted to eliminate the rule which requires
contracts were unfair. We decided on the theory that any bad arbitration gives
arbitration a bad name." Id.
305. Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor Management
Disputes, in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 313-330 (Rena A. Gorlin ed.,
1990).
306. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES OF ARBITRATION OF
STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYER-PROMULGATED SYSTEMS 2 (1997).
307. Id.
308. See supra notes 258-84 and accompanying text.
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that all registered representatives submit their statutory discrimi-
nation claims to arbitration. 3 9 This turnabout sentiment on the
part of this segment of the industry is no doubt partly attributa-
ble to the efforts of members of Congress to put pressure on the
industry to change the now famous part of the U-4 provision that
appears in each broker's application to become a licensed securi-
ties broker or dealer and that makes mandatory arbitration of
employment disputes a condition of registration.31 °
VIII. S.63 AND H. R. 938: INADEQUATE ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT
GCIL.M_&R AND TO PRESERVE THE JUDICIAL FORUM
In the wake of Gilmer, it appears that the Court will uphold
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims if two con-
ditions are met: first, a bargain to arbitrate has been made; and
second, the party seeking to avoid arbitration cannot demon-
strate that Congress intended to preserve the judicial forum. As
mentioned previously, a party can demonstrate that Congress did
intend to preserve the judicial forum by showing the existence of
such an intent in either the text or legislative history of the stat-
ute at issue, or by showing an inherent conflict between the stat-
ute and arbitration. Barring this showing, however, the only
other solution available to plaintiffs appears to be the time-
honored remedy of a legislative amendment.
On January 21, 1997, Senator Russ Feingold (R-Wis) intro-
duced Senate Bill 63, and on March 6, 1997, Rep. Edward Mar-
key (D-Mass) and Rep. Connie Morella (R-Md) introduced H.R.
983, a companion bill.311 Sen. Feingold has noted that there is a
309. See Mark L. Goldstein & Andrea H. Stempel, Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1997, at 1.
310. See id. (citing Feingold Urges SEC to Advise Industry To End Mandatory
Arbitration of Job Claims, 68 Daily Lab. Rep. A-7 (Apr. 9, 1997).
311. Prior to the introduction of S. 63, Sen. Feingold had introduced S.
366, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). S. 366 never left committee, as was the case
with its predecessor S. 2405, which was first introduced on August 18, 1994.
One day earlier, on August 17, 1994, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Rep.
Edward Markey (D-MA) and Rep. Marjorie Margolies Mezvinsky (D-PA) had
introduced H.R. 4981. On June 27, 1996, Rep. Patricia Schroeder introduced
H.R. 3748, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., which also never left committee.
As introduced, the current bills, S. 63 and H.R. 983 would "amend certain
Federal civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration
to claims that arise from unlawful employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability; and for other purposes."
The statutes that would be amended under S. 63 and H.R.983 are as
follows: 1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1994); 2) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1994); 3) Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 795 (1994); 4) Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1981
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rapidly growing practice of requiring employees "to submit
claims of discrimination and harassment to arbitration."3 12 Sena-
tor Feingold further notes that an entire industry, Wall Street,
has been able to circumvent civil rights laws by requiring
mandatory arbitration.
3 13
The two bills, entitled the Civil Rights Procedures Protection
Act of 1997, will accomplish a very important purpose of preserv-
ing the judicial forum by showing a congressional intent to pre-
serve such forum on the face of the statute. In this respect, it will
clearly meet the test as spelled out in Gilmer. It addresses, to a
certain extent, two of the due process concerns discussed above:
(1) the "voluntariness" question posed by mandatory arbitration
and (2) the pre-dispute/post-dispute question, making the statu-
tory procedures the exclusive ones unless the agreement is
reached after the dispute arises. Under this legislation, the rules
would change and Gilmer agreements would be limited to post-
dispute circumstances. These are broad, sweeping changes that
the author does not foresee taking place in light of the popular-
ity of pre-dispute agreements among employers and the relative
ease with which employers have bound employees to such
agreements.
Notwithstanding the above major proposed changes, in light
of the concerns of the professional organizations, bar associa-
tions, public entities such as the EEOC, and the realities defined
for the stakeholders, what should additionally be included in any
legislation passed in this area are as follows. First, there must be
specific provisions for insuring that the agreements are "knowing
and voluntary." Second, the arbitrators must be properly trained
and include a demographically diverse group of arbitrators with
respect to race and gender. Third, the procedures must be fair
regarding discovery. Fourth, employees must get financial assist-
ance where needed to secure attorneys or other capable repre-
(1994); (6) The Equal Pay Requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); (7) Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1994); and Section 14 of Title 9 of the United States
Code. The proposed amendment to these sections generally provide as follows:
EXCLUSIVITY OF POWERS AND PROCEDURES
Nothwithstanding any Federal statute of general applicability that
would modify any of the powers and procedures expressly applicable
to a claim arising under this title, such powers and procedures shall be
the exclusive procedures applicable to such claim unless after such
claim arises the claimant voluntarily enters into an agreement to
resolve such claim through arbitration or other procedure.
312. See supra note 311.
313. See supra note 7 for a discussion of Senator Feingold's comments.
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sentatives and to pay the costs of arbitrations. Finally, the arbitral
awards must be published.
To accomplish these goals, any legislative amendment will
additionally need to detail the above provisions necessary to
meet the public policy changes and due process requirements in
the agreements and the actual processes offered by employers.
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA)314
is instructive on how go about accomplishing this goal. In fact, in
Gilmer, the Court as much as invites such assistance in interpret-
ing its decision by its reference to the OWBPA provisions, which
permit a waiver of rights under the ADEA only if certain ele-
ments listed are met which satisfy the "knowing and voluntary"315
provisionof the OWBPA. Otherwise, employers will continue to
lack the knowledge to avoid the due process criticisms they now
encounter.
CONCLUSION
Mandatory arbitration of statutory employment disputes has
emerged as an important mechanism for resolving some of the
most significant employment problems that exist in our society
today. It is apparent from its widespread use that it is favored by
employers as an alternative to the sometimes long, involved and
expensive procedures that are statutorily available to disputants.
Nevertheless, from the numbers of federal cases being filed, due
in part to the unanswered questions in Gilmer and from the out-
cry of those who realize that the current system is fraught with
due process concerns, what is even more apparent is that certain
safeguards must be put in place to assure that this ADR mecha-
nism does not render void employees' statutory rights. The
unfairness of the procedures involved in challenging employ-
ment actions demands such changes. Unless and until legislative
changes are instituted to assure that the statutory rights under-
pinning the employment discrimination disputes are guaranteed,
the injustices about which employees complain will be further
amplified in their workplaces, and neither employers nor
employees will be well-served.
314. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994). The OWBPA overturned Public Employees
Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). Title II of the OWBPA amended
Sect. 4(f) (2) of the ADEA.
315. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 n.3
(1991).

